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Structural Holes, CEOs, and
Informational Monopolies

THE MISSING LINK IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

*

Lawrence E. Mitchell†
Where was the board? This is the question that has
resounded throughout the business and scholarly communities,
as well as the public more broadly, as scandals from Enron to
WorldCom and more have come to light over the last several
years. Traditional corporate governance scholarship, as well as
generally accepted legal principles, tell us that the board is the
ultimate corporate monitor, the failsafe for managerial
excesses and the circuit breaker in times of corporate crisis.1
But case after case of corporate scandal, as well as gardenvariety stockholder litigation, reveals that boards were
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1
See, e.g., Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance after Enron and Global
Crossing: Comparative Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. L. J. 723, 72529 (2003); Richard S. Booth, Form and Function in Business Organizations, 58 BUS.
LAW. 1433, 1448 (2003); Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47
Bus. Law. 461, 527 (1992); Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1987); see generally Robert W. Hamilton,
Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes But Uncertain Benefits,
25 J. CORP. L. 349 (2000); ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
†
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unaware of internal corporate misbehavior until matters
reached the point of crisis.2
The board may not be the culprit. Many of the scandals,
such as CEO Dennis Kozlowski’s use of Tyco as his personal
piggybank, senior executives and the CEO of WorldCom’s
fictionalized financial statements, Andy Fastow’s enormous
profits at Enron’s expense under CEO Jeff Skilling, and a host
of shareholder suits, suggest that the board may have been
ignorant of what was occurring in the corporation beneath
them, not necessarily because they weren’t doing their jobs, but
because they were unable to do their jobs. The relevant
information was hidden from them or falsified. The implication
is that often it was senior executives, and especially the CEO,
who were at fault—not the board.3
2

Obviously, boards in litigation over corporate scandals have a conflict of
interest with CEOs and other corporate managers who they are likely to blame, and
claim their own ignorance, which poses some problem of their credibility. But the issue
of inadequately informed boards has been sufficiently common through modern
corporate history that substantial board ignorance of managerial shenanigans seems
like a reasonable assumption.
3
Certainly from the criminal perspective of these scandals it is the CEO and
senior executives who are being indicted and convicted, not the board. See, e.g., Press
Release, United States Dep’t of Justice, Four Former Qwest Communications
Executives Indicted for Fraud (Feb. 25, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2003/February/03_crm_112.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005) (announcing the
indictment of four executives at Qwest Communications, including Qwest’s former
Chief Financial Officer for Qwest’s Global Business Unit; a senior vice president,
another vice president, and Qwest’s assistant controller).
TYCO: This February, the former Chief Financial Officer of Tyco
International, Mark H. Swartz, was indicted on tax evasion charges. The indictment
alleges that Swartz illegally evaded nearly $5 million in personal federal income taxes.
Brooke A. Masters, Tyco Official Indicted on More Charges, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2003,
at E4.
DYNEGY: In January, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of
Texas obtained a seven-count indictment charging Michelle Maria Valencia, a former
senior natural gas trader with Dynegy Marketing and Trade, with filing bogus reports
to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that are used to calculate the “index”
price of natural gas. Record Home Sales, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2003, at E2.
EL PASO: In Houston last December, a federal grand jury returned an
indictment against Todd Geiger, an energy trader at El Paso Corporation, on charges of
falsely reporting price information to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and
wire fraud as part of a scheme to manipulate energy prices. Productivity, Services
Grow, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2002, at E2.
MERCURY FINANCE: In December, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Northern District of Illinois obtained an indictment of Bradley Vallem, the former
treasurer of the now-defunct Mercury Finance Company, on bank fraud and wire fraud
charges in connection with his participation in a scheme to overstate revenue and hide
losses of more than $30 million. John Schmeltzer, Mercury Finance ex-CEO indicted;
Lawyer says Client to Plead Not Guilty, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 2005, at C1.
COMMERCIAL FINANCIAL SERVICES: In December, the U.S. Attorney’s Office
for the Northern District of Oklahoma and the Justice Department’s Criminal Division
obtained the indictment of Commercial Financial Services’ former CEO William
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This is particularly striking in light of the fact that
corporate governance scholarship, at least since the time of
Berle and Means, has focused on the board as the corporate
constituent best situated to manage or monitor the
corporation’s affairs and overcome the intrinsic conflict of
interest that arises when corporate managers have access to
the shareholders’ money. That scholarship, as well as a variety
of reform efforts and a substantial amount of case law, has
viewed board structure as the solution to what has become
known, for the last thirty years, as the “agency problem” in
corporate governance.4
Drawing on economic sociology, I argue that corporate
law reform efforts have focused on the wrong actors: while the
law’s principal interest is board governance, it should instead
focus on the CEO and how the relationship between internal
corporate
structures
and
board
structures
provide
5
opportunities for misconduct. While the CEO is important to
the initial inquiry, the real problem goes even deeper; the focus
of corporate law should be on the CEO and the entire senior
Bartmann for mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud and money laundering. Fallen Firm’s
CEO Faces Fraud Claims in Federal Indictment, CHI TRIB., Dec. 13, 2002, at D3.
INFORMIX: In November, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern
District of California obtained the indictment of former Informix CEO Phillip White on
charges of securities, mail and wire fraud in connection with financial accounting fraud
at the database software company. Matt Richtel, Finding Wrongs, Through the Prism
of Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2002, at C1.
PEREGRINE SYSTEMS: In November, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Southern District of California obtained the conviction by guilty plea of Ilse Cappel, an
assistant treasurer at Peregrine Systems, a San Diego software company. Cappel
pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to commit bank fraud. Don Bauder, WhiteCollar Crimes Won’t Elude Justice, SAN DIEGO TRIB., Nov. 23, 2002, at C1.
ENRON: Four former Enron employees and former Arthur Andersen
accountant David Duncan have pleaded guilty to various charges and are cooperating
with investigators. Former Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow has been indicted
on 78 counts, and three former British bankers have been indicted in connection with
an Enron deal. 2002 Will Be Remembered as the Year Executives Paid the Price for
Cooking Their Books, Wall Street Shame, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, at E1.
4
See Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corprate
Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 898 (1996); A.L.I.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §3A.01
(1992). See also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
5
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker understand the role of CEO power in the
context of compensation issues. See Lucien Ayre Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 75361 (2002); LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Donald C. Langevoort,
The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 797-802 (2001)
(explaining the source of bargaining defects in analyzing the role of the CEO in relation
to board structure).
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management structure of the corporation, examining the
relationship of that structure to the board’s ability to perform.
Questions of whether the board should manage or monitor,6
whether its role is political,7 whether it should be concerned
with the provision of resources as the most efficient way to
limit agency costs,8 or as a mediator of team production,9
whether the board is subject to structural bias,10 whether it is
reliable because of its members conflicting interests,11 or
whether the board is subject to the perils of groupthink,12 all
take a back seat to this fundamental structural question.
Focusing on the board without paying attention to these
structural characteristics of the corporation will not change the
status quo, no matter how dramatic the reforms.13
I have based my conclusion on the combination of two
interrelated hypotheses, which, taken together, offer powerful
insight into the role of corporate structure. They are:
1. Corporations that have inside boards will have a
weak CEO (one who is dominated by the board); and
2. Corporations that have independent boards will have
a strong CEO (one who dominates the board).

6

See Hamilton, supra note 1.
See Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Do Some Outside Directors Play
a Political Role?, 44 J.L. & ECON. 179 (2001).
8
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976).
9
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999).
10
See James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsingner, Bias in the Boardroom:
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 84-85 (1985).
11
See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983).
12
See Marleen O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2002-2003).
13
Leading corporation law treatises and casebooks make little or no mention
of CEOs and other senior officers except for discussion of the sources and scope of their
authority. See, e.g., JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY:
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (5th ed. 2003); JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS (1997);
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW (2000); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed.
2000); WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 2003). Atypical is a brief
discussion of the practical role of the CEO in modern corporate practice in ROBERT W.
HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 701-05 (8th ed. 2003).
7
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While I acknowledge that these hypotheses are contrary
to virtually all legal wisdom on the subject,14 the theoretical
construct I present suggests their power. Assuming my
hypotheses are correct, the traditional scholarly focus on the
board without attention to the CEO and senior management is
14

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers:
Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 810 (2002) (“[T]he Delaware courts take
the board’s distinct role quite seriously, especially with respect to its independent
members.”); James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest:
Empowering the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077
(2003) (“The important role that independent directors have in monitoring and
managing conflicts of interest reflects our societal commitment to the power of the
outside director. . . . Today, in the post-Enron era, the outside director continues to be
the focus of corporate governance reforms.”); Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of
Boards of Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781, 787 (2003) (“Perhaps the most
significant trend in board governance in the United States in the last twenty years has
been the increase in the number and proportion of outside directors . . . .”). Dallas
proposes a two-tiered board model with a mixed board and outside board that, while
this paper does not endorse at the moment, does intuit some of the conclusions I reach.
Delaware Chancellor William Chandler recently has expressed his view that courts
should not “rely reflexively” on a director’s status as inside or independent in according
deference or not, but rather should take matters case by case. William B. Chandler III,
On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1083 (1999).
The principal area in which legal scholars and, especially, economists, have
noticed the increased power of the CEO is in the realm of compensation. Bebchuk et al.,
supra note 5, at 766; Robert A. Lambert et al., The Structure of Organizational
Incentives, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 438 (1993); Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, The Board
of Directors, and Executive Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 4
INDUS. AND CORP. CHANGE 293 (1995); Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive
Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 847 (2002); Edward J. Zajac & James D. Westphal, Accounting for the
Explanations of CEO Compensation: Substance and Symbolism, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 283
(1995). These studies generally focus on market imperfections relating to the failure of
outside boards and consulting firms to understand the true cost of options. See, e.g.,
Murphy, supra. They fail to understand the critical importance of structure which, if
misaligned, can hamstring even the most sophisticated boards and consultants. But see
Ann K. Buchholtz et al., Are Board Members Pawns or Watchdogs?, 23 GROUP & ORG.
MGMT. 6 (1998) (finding correlations between increased CEO strength and increased
board strength).
There have been dissenting voices from time to time over the wisdom of
independent boards as a general reform solution, some of which acknowledges the role
of the CEO in either manipulating or otherwise disempowering independent boards.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate
Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034 (1993) (questioning the value—at
least the universal value—of independent directors); Victor Brudney, The Independent
Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982); Jill E.
Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265 (1997); Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1282 (1982); Roberta S.
Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 535 (1984) (questioning the monitoring model of the board based on outside
directors proposed by the ALI); Langevoort, supra note 5. The explanations as to the
uncertain benefits of independent boards vary. The virtue of the approach I take is its
theoretical coherence. I recognize, at the same time, that theoretical coherence may
result in oversimplification; qualifications to my theory are presented infra notes 11117 and accompanying text.
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misdirected. At the very least, my hypotheses suggest that
advocacy of independent boards,15 which has been the trend
over the last thirty years,16 is simply wrongheaded.17
This focus on the board has led corporate law scholars
(with several notable exceptions18) to ignore the extraordinary
increase in CEO power.19 Focusing on corporate structure leads
us to conclude that the increase in CEO power is the result of
increasing board independence.20 At the same time, evidence
15

Standard terminology divides directors into three categories: inside
directors, who are officers of the company, affiliated directors (or “gray directors”), who
have some business relationship with the company (investment bankers and lawyers
are typical examples), and independent directors, who have no relationship with the
company other than their service as directors. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The
Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J.
CORP. L. 231, 239 (2002). My argument focuses principally on the problem of
independent directors, although affiliated directors suffer from problems similar to the
ones I shall examine if to a lesser degree.
16
Bhagat and Black describe the “conventional wisdom” that only
independent directors can be effective monitors. Bhagat & Black, supra note 15, at 232.
The advocacy of this “conventional wisdom” has led to regulatory and quasi-regulatory
requirements of increased outside directors, most recently the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, which requires outside directors on the audit
committee, and the New York Stock Exchange’s well-publicized rule revisions which
require listed corporations to have a majority of outside directors. New York Stock
Exchange, Corporate Rule Proposals Reflecting Recommendations from the NYSE
Report of the Exchange Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee as
Approved by the NYSE Board of Directors, Aug. 1, 2002, § 303, at A1.
17
Certainly this is the implication of Bhagat and Black’s work. Bhagat &
Black, supra note 15, at 233.
18
See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 783-95; Langevoort, supra note 5.
19
Westphal, in an empirical study, concludes that CEOs have developed
behavioral patterns that counteract the greater potential board control associated with
board independence. See James D. Westphal, Board Games: How CEOs Adapt to
Increases in Structural Board Independence From Management, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 511,
529-31 (1998). Klein, consistent with other studies, finds little relationship between
corporate performance and board structure. However, consistent with the argument I
present here, she does note that the presence of insiders on finance and investment
committees is correlated with superior corporate performance, consistent with the
notion that insiders provide valuable information to the board. April Klein, Firm
Performance and Board Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275 (1998). Robert W.
Hamilton argues that in the 1950s much of the work of the board was done by the
CEO. Hamilton, supra note 1, at 349-50.
To a limited extent, the recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act seems to
intuit the importance of the CEO, requiring his certification of the corporation’s
financial statements and thereby increasing his incentives for integrity and careful
monitoring through the device of federal sanctions for his failure. This seems more
sensitive to the identity of the real culprits in the corporate scandals that led to the
Act’s passage, but it doesn’t really follow through on the implications of this intuition.
Moreover, following traditional reform approaches, it also places great importance on
the board, and particularly the importance of an independent audit committee.
20
Bebchuk, Fried and Walker acknowledge the increase in recent years in
the number and power of independent directors. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 773.
That the level of the CEO’s power can be seen as along a continuum should not be
surprising. “Organizations are information processors,” and the critical variable is the
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shows that the increasing independence of boards has,
predictably, decreased trust between CEOs and boards.21
The wisdom of board independence has come under
serious question. Bhagat and Black, in an important empirical
study, examine a thirty year trend toward greater board
independence during which “the composition of public company
boards of directors has changed radically . . . .”22 This study
provides striking evidence that independent boards not only
fail to improve corporate performance, they may in fact make it
worse.23 While Bhagat and Black speculate as to the causes of
this phenomenon, by their own admission they are unable to
fully explain it, and continue to suggest remedies that focus on
board reform.
The theory set forth here does explain the phenomenon
observed by Bhagat and Black. In Part I of this article, I will
explain the significance of my theory to corporate law reform
efforts. Parts II and III will explicate the underlying theory.
Part IV will demonstrate how my hypotheses explain the direct
CEO’s position in the networks of information flows. See Nitin Nohria & James D.
Berkley, The Virtual Organization: Bureaucracy, Technology, and the Implosion of
Control, in THE POST-BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 108, 118 (Charles Hecksher & Anne Donnellon eds., 1994)
21
Ranjay Gulati & James D. Westphal, Cooperative or Controlling? The
Effects of CEO-Board Relations and the Content of Interlocks on the Formation of Joint
Ventures, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 473, 477-79 (1999); In one of the relatively few law review
articles to challenge the conventional wisdom, Donald C. Langevoort argues that
increased board independence decreases trust and interferes with effective
communication. Langevoort, supra note 5, at 800. Westphal’s findings of manipulative
CEO behavior certainly justify this lack of trust on the part of the board. Westphal,
Board Games, supra note 19, at 530-31.
22
Bhagat & Black, supra note 15, at 238. They note that in 1970, there
appeared to be on average 54% inside directors, 26% outside directors, and 20%
independent directors in the sample set studied. By 1991, they report that the median
corporation in their sample set of 934 of the largest corporations in the United States
had 23% inside directors, 13% outside directors, and 64% independent directors.
Finally, they note that by 1997, the mean number of inside directors at Fortune 500
corporations was 2, and that 56% of the S&P 500 firms “had only one or two inside
directors.” Id. at 238. The trend is rather clear.
23
Id. See also Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and
Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders, 31 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALALYSIS 377 (1996) (for an earlier study suggesting that too
many outsiders correlate with poorer corporate performance); Sanjai Bhagat &
Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm
Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999) (literature survey showing inconclusive evidence
of the effect of independent boards); April Klein, Firm Performance and Board
Committee Structure, 41 J.L. AND ECON. 275 (1998) (concluding that independent board
committees don’t improve corporate performance). For an earlier survey of studies
concluding that different kinds of directors make a difference in given situations, see
also Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors As a Corporate Governance
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898 (1996).
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relationship between increased board independence and CEO
power, and Part V will discuss the extent to which managers a
level or two below the CEO might also be in a structural
position to manipulate both the board and the CEO.
Following this discussion, Part VI will address a second
independent variable that might have an important magnifying
effect on CEO power: the bureaucratic organization of the
corporation itself. While corporate reformers have been
advocating independent boards, important changes in
corporate structure have taken place. Large public
corporations, once rigidly hierarchical, have, at least in some
industries (and sometimes within industries), substantially
shifted to more horizontal management systems. This
horizontal management structure magnifies the strength of the
CEO, whether the board is an inside board or an independent
one. Because this conclusion is still tentative, however, I
reserve this discussion for the end of the article. Part VII will
conclude with some possible directions for further research and
reform.
I.

THE POWER OF THE THEORY

My hypotheses derive from a subgenre of economic
sociology and specifically a subgenre of network theory, known
as the theory of structural holes.24 I will reserve a more detailed
explanation of structural hole theory for the next section. For
now, I will briefly define and illustrate structural holes and
suggest why structural hole theory holds such great promise
for corporate scholarship, even as it reveals the importance of
focusing on internal corporate structures.25

24

Network analysis is a genre of sociology that, contrary to typical
sociological analysis which begins from studies of individuals and classifies them into
social structures by grouping their characteristics, instead begins with the structure as
the unit of analysis, representing social structures as networks and actors as nodes
within those networks, in order to identify the constraints on individual behavior
arising from the social structure. BARRY WELLMAN & S.D. BERKOWITZ, SOCIAL
STRUCTURES: A NETWORK APPROACH 3, 4 (1988).
25
Let me make it clear at the outset that the theory I am applying is an
adaptation of the essential aspects of structural hole theory. Structural hole theory, as
presented by Burt, while an intuitively apparent idea, has enormously complexity and
applicability, and Burt ranges from explanations of market behavior to a theory of the
firm to a theory of personality. The adaptation of the theory I apply takes the basic
defining aspects of structural holes and implicitly combines it with Granovetter’s weak
ties theory (to which it is intimately related) for the purpose of creating a hybrid theory
that allows us to take a broad view of corporate structure and its potential deformities.
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To understand structural holes, one must begin with the
proposition that people are socially organized into distinct
networks. Sometimes networks overlap through common
members. Sometimes they are completely distinct, with no ties
to each other. When two networks are distinct and lack ties to
each other, the gap between them is a structural hole. The
structural hole provides an opportunity for a person to
establish contact with each of the two networks, bridging the
structural hole and giving him or herself informational and
control advantages.
Think, for example, of a university’s anthropology
department and its sociology department. Assume that the
departments are relatively small, and that the members of the
respective departments know each other reasonably well, at
least as colleagues. Each department is a single network. Its
members have significant professional and, perhaps, social ties
to one another. It is likely, however, given the nature of the two
disciplines, that at least several members of each department
will know each other well. The two networks overlap through
these associations, and while this does not destroy the integrity
of each department as a network, it does connect the networks
so that no structural holes exist. This connection provides
members of each department who are unacquainted with
members of the other department with some substantial
information (gossip or scholarly) about what is going on in the
other department, through colleagues who bridge the networks.
Now consider the same university’s physics department
and its law school. As with the preceding example, each
division of the university forms a network. It is unlikely (with
the possible exception of chance acquaintance on university
committees or relationships off campus) that any of the
members of the physics department and any of the members of
the law faculty know each other. The gap between these
networks is a structural hole.
There may be no reason for physics professors and law
professors to bridge this gap. On the other hand, there might.
Assume that women form a relatively small minority of each of
the physics and law faculties. Next assume that the university
neither provides on-site childcare nor provides child care
subsidies. Further assume that most of the men on each faculty
leave childcare principally to their wives and therefore don’t
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view it as of particular concern.26 But some of the women do.
However, these women do not form a sufficiently large
constituency in either department to compel their respective
faculties to act, or to challenge the university’s parsimony. A
woman who is a member of the law faculty, forced to deal with
this problem, can consciously make the effort to become
acquainted with at least one woman on the physics faculty. She
is now bridging the structural hole. The utility of such a bridge
is obvious. Through her contact with the physics professor, the
law professor unites the two networks (or in this case subnetworks) of women faculty. By so doing, she is able to gauge
the strength of the inchoate demand for childcare and, by
joining the networks (particularly if the law professor repeats
this effort in every department and school of the university),
she may be able to compel the administration to act. This is one
value of bridging structural holes.
There is a negative side to structural holes too. Assume
that no woman on the university faculty sees this structural
hole opportunity. The only bridge among the different
departments and schools is the university administration (and
for sake of simplicity, let us identify the administration as the
university president). If the women in the physics department
approach the president and ask for child care relief without
themselves bridging the structural hole, the president is in a
position to play the faculties against each other to his or her
advantage. He or she might, for example, threaten to cut a
portion of the law school’s budget to pay for on-campus
childcare because the physics department, which already has
budgetary constraints, is demanding the service. The law
school will object to having its budget cut to subsidize the
physicists, even if the women law faculty might benefit. The
president can then cite the law school’s protest to the physics
department as a reason to deny child care benefits. As the sole
bridge of the structural hole, the president can set the two
sides off against each other.
The president can also manipulate the situation by
creating a structural hole that remains unfilled—in other
words, by intentionally splitting two connected networks. For
example, assume that the president sets up a management
structure in which department heads and deans report only to
26

justification.

I realize this example is gendered but plead current social realities as a
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the provost, and that all university-wide faculty committees,
whether ad hoc or formal, can gain audience only with the
provost or one of his subordinates. The president delegates
authority to the provost to make all decisions that come out of
these reports, ensuring that the provost has a good sense of the
president’s interests. By cutting off reporting from the provost,
the president has created a structural hole between herself and
the provost that is unfilled and, given her control and the
university structure, unfillable. The provost can deny the
request and there can be no appeal to the president.
Of course every faculty member knows that such a
situation, if enacted in the world of academia, would create an
uproar that would make the president’s life miserable. I offer
this example because it is simple and familiar. In the corporate
context, to which I will later turn, such manipulation is much
easier, for power is more clearly defined, less democratically
wielded, and job termination is always a threat. For the
moment, however, the foregoing should clarify the definition of
structural holes and provide some insight into their utility.
Figure One illustrates a structural hole bridged by you.
Figure 1:

Structural Hole

Structural hole theory was developed by Ronald Burt in
the 1980s and early 1990s, culminating in Structural Holes,27
its most comprehensive examination. Burt explains
competition as a function of social structure by looking at the
ways in which competitors can maximize their opportunities by
27

RONALD STATE BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
COMPETITION (1992).
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manipulating to their advantage the social structures in which
they operate. This contrasts with neoclassical economic
analysis, which focuses on individual transactions and the
wealth maximizing motivations of individuals. Structural hole
theory is closely related to transaction cost economics,28 which
explains the origin of organizations in, among other things, the
desire to restrain opportunistic behavior arising from the
neoclassical goal of diminished transaction costs.29 But it is
richer than these theories because structural hole theory
allows us to dispense with the unrealistic essentialized
motivations of actors that characterize the competing theories
as well as to broaden our perspective beyond the dyadic
transaction.30 Instead, structural hole theory leads us to see
competition as a process occurring within preexisting
structures,31 obviating the need for unrealistic assumptions and
situating the theory in the complexities of the world in which
competition takes place.32 Structural hole theory treats the
28

Transaction cost economics, or “the new institutional economics,” finds its
origin in Ronald Coase’s 1937 theory of the firm, Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
4 ECONOMICA 385 (1937), and was developed most thoroughly by Oliver Williamson.
OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975).
29
Williamson’s theory is considerably more complex than this, describing the
origins of organization not only in terms of restraining opportunism but also as a result
of conditions of uncertainty, asset specificity, bounded rationality, and the like. See
WILLIAMSON, supra note 28, at 7. The analysis does focus on transaction cost reduction,
however, and I focus on opportunism in the text because it is the aspect of Williamson’s
concern most related to this paper.
Granovetter notes the undersocialized nature of Williamson’s theory as
well as his over reliance on the power of hierarchy to restrain opportunism. Mark S.
Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91
AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 481, 481-510 (1985).
Structural hole theory also has close relationship to resource dependence
theory which is not especially relevant to my analysis. JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R.
SALANCIK, The External Control of Organizations (1978) is the ur-text on resource
dependence theory.
To be sure, Burt takes great pains to show the consistency of his theory
with transaction cost theory and resource dependency theory (and even traces some of
his intellectual roots back to Coase) in his development of his theory of the firm. BURT,
supra note 27, at 238-45. My characterization of the differences in the text that lead me
to argue that structural hole theory is an improvement over these theories is my own,
not Burt’s.
30
Williamson proclaims his unrelenting reliance on the transaction as the
unit of analysis. WILLIAMSON, supra note 28, at 1-2.
31
To put it differently, for all of its sophistication in trying to come to grips
with organizational structure and its sources and consequences, transaction cost theory
remains mired in the unrealistic assumptions of neoclassical economics.
32
Burt himself, especially in his argument in Chapter Seven, sometimes
seems to lapse into the same motivational assumptions (although he doesn’t describe
them this way) as Coase and Williamson. Nevertheless, from a purely structural
perspective, one can easily read his basic theory as dispensing with these assumptions

4/11/2005 2:37:27 PM

2005]

STRUCTURAL HOLES, CEOS, AND INFORMATIONAL MONOPOLIES 1325

process of competition as a function of relations that are visible
only by their absence—an absence we might refer to as gaps in
the social structure. These gaps—these structural holes—allow
actors within a social network the freedom to behave
entrepreneurially (or opportunistically). As a general matter,
the kinds of social networks most relevant to this discussion
are networks of managers within the corporation.
While there are many ways in which an actor in this
context can manipulate the social structure, the kind of
opportunism most relevant here is that of a manager placing
herself in a position where she will maximize the likelihood of
receiving information and the opportunity to disseminate it as
she desires.33
The freedom to behave opportunistically within social
networks—including the social networks within corporations—
arises because they create circumstances of imperfect
competition by placing given actors in advantaged positions (or
creating opportunities for them to seize advantaged positions).
Further, social networks structure these positions and the
relations between other actors in such a way that movement
for those who are not in advantaged positions is relatively
difficult. (In economic terms, social structure introduces
friction into the “market” so that competition is imperfect.)
Circumstances of imperfect competition create opportunities
for advantage. In practical terms, imperfect competition in this
context means that some actors are “stuck” in place in the
corporate hierarchy or are positionally situated to be
constrained by other actors, while others, who have the ability
to identify gaps in the structure, are free to move in and fill the
gaps.34 This is most likely to be the case when a given actor
performs the same (or largely the same) function as another
actor. As I will later explain, in network terms, such actors are
redundant—they have the same contacts—and so only one, if
either, will be of use to an actor in an advantaged position and
as he does on his own terms. See BURT, supra note 27.
33
See generally BURT, supra note 27, at ch. 4.
34
The use of the economic concept of imperfect competition here may be
jarring to those who are used to seeing it used only in the context of markets. But
competition can occur in other spheres of life as well and it is at least metaphorically, if
not literally, useful to adopt the phrase to describe the circumstances under which
social behavior within social networks takes place. I ask the reader to be careful,
however, because I am using the term (and applying the theory) in the corporate
context, which itself is an economic realm and could easily lead readers to think of the
competition I describe in economic terms. In my application, the competition is social,
not economic (even if in some cases it may have economic consequences).
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only one will therefore have the opportunity to move into the
advantaged position.
The principal benefits accruing to the advantaged
actors—the actors who can see and are free to occupy
structural holes—are access to information and the ability to
control others. The actor who best understands how to exploit
the informational and control advantages of the structural
holes (and indeed knows best how to recognize and occupy
those structural holes) is the actor who will emerge as the most
successful: he is a network entrepreneur. These opportunities
are resources existing in every social network and organization
and they are waiting to be exploited. Those who can identify
and fill the structural holes will do better—whatever the
rewards of the network—than those who lack this ability.
I should note that Burt presents his theory as a positive
one; that is, a theory of enhancing value that explains how
competitors can improve their positions and attain the
advantages that go with this improvement. But there is a dark
side to structural hole theory as well.35 Though it is a theory of
value, it can also be seen as a theory of manipulation,
opportunism, and inefficiency. This article will focus on these
aspects of the theory in the context of corporate governance.
This very brief introduction to structural hole theory
demonstrates why it is such a powerful analytical tool.
Corporate governance scholarship has traditionally centered on
what has come to be known as the “agency problem.”36 The
question the agency problem presents is how to restrain
corporate managers from shirking responsibility or stealing
corporate assets. In the bulk of corporate scholarship over the
last thirty years, the problem has taken the form of finding
ways to reduce agency costs, i.e., the costs that arise from
monitoring and preventing shirking and stealing (deadweight
economic losses) or, to put it differently, of finding the most
efficient ways to restrain shirking and stealing. While agency
cost theory has made substantial contributions to our
35

See Carlo Morselli, Structuring Mr. Nice: Entrepreneurial Opportunities
and Brokerage Positioning in the Cannabis Trade, 35 CRIME, LAW & SOC. CHANGE 203
(2001); Robert Tillman & Michael Indergaard, Field of Schemes: Health Insurance
Fraud in the Small Business Sector, 46 SOC. PROBS. 572 (1999).
36
Despite the predominance of neoclassical economic analysis since that
time, as I noted earlier, the focus has existed at least since the time of Berle and
Means. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1933). See also Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931).
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understanding of corporate governance, its flaw is that it takes
the traditional analytical approach of the subject as a given—it
begins with the received structure of corporate law and treats
the internal workings of the corporation largely as a black box.37
Of course this is a flaw in the traditional approach itself.38
Structural hole theory refocuses our inquiry by taking
us into the box. Its power derives from several aspects of the
sociological approach in which it originates. First, because the
theory focuses on structure, it need not resort to the simplified
assumption used by agency cost and transaction cost theorists
that corporate actors seek only to maximize their wealth.39
While this assumption does have utility in economic modeling,
it places the corporate reformer in a difficult position. If we
start with greed as an immutable motivation for behavior in
the corporate context,40 our goal of reforming corporate law is
hamstrung by the fact that we need to devise tools to restrain
corporate actors’ pursuit of their own wealth even to the point
of transgressing corporate norms. But history has
demonstrated that restraining greed is an enormously difficult
task. Even the attempts to align managerial and stockholder
interests by encouraging executive compensation in the form of
stock options has encouraged greed, which has led to
substantial abuse, and is thus a partial cause of much
corporate misbehavior.41
37

This is actually not true of the work of Fama and Jensen themselves, who
build the corporate structure as evolving to provide the most efficient solutions to the
agency problem. Fama & Jensen, supra note 11. See also Eugene Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980). Bainbridge also
provides and exception, looking within corporate hierarchies to evaluate the quality of
information flows throughout the corporation. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory
Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657 (1996).
38
See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist
Society, 24 J. CORP. L. 869 (1999) (arguing for the need for corporate governance
scholars to expand their study into the internal workings of the corporation itself).
39
Williamson extends the self-interest model to opportunism. See
WILLIAMSON, supra note 28, at 26-30.
40
I recognize that the pursuit of maximum self-interest assumed by
neoclassicists can extend beyond monetary greed and apply to other preferences as
well. In the corporate context, however, it is almost invariably assumed that the issue
is money. Thus the reference to greed seems perfectly appropriate and accurate.
41
See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S
NEWEST EXPORT (2001); Bebchuk et al., supra note 5; Murphy, supra note 14. For an
excellent example of the relationship between managerial opportunism and corporate
bureaucracy (which nonetheless focuses more on inefficient information production
rather than structure per se), see Walter Novaes & Luigi Zingales, Bureaucracy as a
Mechanism to Generate Information, CENTRE FOR ECON. POL’Y RES., June 2003, which
argues that the information (managerial performance) creating potential of
bureaucracies, coupled with managerial incentives to extract undue rent from the

4/11/2005 2:37:27 PM

1328

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4

A focus on structure as creating the conditions for
opportunistic behavior allows us not only to consider broader
motivations, but also enables us to see the way in which
structural freedoms and constraints, in contrast to monitoring
and mistrust, can alleviate problems that are the concern of
agency theorists and other corporate scholars. In other words,
rather than focusing on the restraint of greed, structural hole
theory identifies places in the corporate structure that provide
room for opportunistic behavior and allows us to concentrate on
eliminating these opportunities for corporate actors to behave
in self-serving ways. For the same reason, it enhances
transaction cost analysis (which begins with the same
motivational assumptions) by allowing us to begin with given
structures rather than individually modeled behavior that
leads to institutional structures. In this way, it reveals the
power of position within structures, and enables us to see ways
of restructuring hierarchies to reduce the circumstances in
which opportunistic behavior can flourish.42 In addition to these
benefits, structural hole theory is well conceived for rigorous
empirical testing, as Burt demonstrates. Instead of relying
upon reductionist accounts of motivation or attitudinal or
psychological self-reporting, all structural hole theory requires
is that survey subjects disclose those people with whom they
have contacts, as well as the regularity and intensity of those
contacts. These results can be verified by independently
obtaining the same information from those with whom the
subject claims to be in contact. Thus the structure emerges as
empirical fact, with relatively little room for distortion.
As a normative matter, structural hole theory can also
show how a corporation can both eliminate structural
blockages and enhance the efficiency of information flows. It
does this by ensuring the proliferation of structural holes
within its networks. As I noted earlier, Burt describes this

corporation, lead boards to choose a bureaucratic structure that produces more
information about executive performance instead of what perhaps might be a more
optimal structure for the maximization of profits. Id.
42
This structural approach bridges the micro approach of transaction cost
economics with the macro approach of network theory. BURT, supra note 27, at 181.
The search for ways to bridge micro and macro models has been a significant project for
sociologists. The bridge provided by network theory is its recognition that structure
provides the resources and individuals attempt to benefit from the resources structure
provides. This is especially noted by social capital theorists. Kenneth A. Frank &
Jeffrey Y. Yasumoto, Linking Action to Social Structure Within a System: Social
Capital Within and Between Subgroups, 104 AM. J. SOC. 642, 645 (1998).
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positively, in an efficiency-enhancing way.43 Efficiency comes
from the placement of trustworthy and loyal actors in positions
where they can bridge structural holes, facilitating the transfer
of information without the fear of manipulation. The theory can
also be used positively for self-advancement, as a network
entrepreneur sees the opportunity to fill a structural hole
within the corporate bureaucracy.
Finally, and most practically, the theory has the power
to explain why simple governance reforms such as creating
independent audit committees, nominating committees, and
compensation committees, or composing boards principally of
independent directors, may not be capable of resolving
problems of inadequate monitoring. All of the board reforms
currently underway will fail unless the structural opportunities
for CEOs and other senior managers to control and manipulate
information are reduced or eliminated. The failure of corporate
law scholars to focus on the special role of the CEO and his
subordinates has limited the set of possible solutions to
corporate governance problems.44 The structural approach,
however, presents new solutions.
II.

THE INTELLECTUAL PROVENANCE OF STRUCTURAL HOLE
THEORY

Structural hole theory is a theory of social capital. While
social capital is a concept that recently has garnered scholarly

43

I will address the efficiency—or positive—aspect of structural holes infra
note 72 and accompanying text. My purpose in this paper is to use the theory in a way
that it has not been used, to examine the dark side of structural holes in the
manipulation of information within the corporation.
44
The CEO may not always be the appropriate focus. Wayne Baker, studying
a commercial real estate development firm that appears to have been a partnership,
explicitly designed to maximize intrafirm networks, but with a designated CEO,
concludes that the absence of the CEO would have little or no effect on firm
performance. See Wayne E. Baker, The Network Organization in Theory and Practice,
in NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE, FORM, AND ACTION 397 (Nitin Nohria
& Robert G. Eccles, eds., 1992). The reason for his conclusion, however, appears to me
to lie both in the partnership nature of the form and the conscious design of the firm to
maximize networks (an approach to firm organization that he believes is highly
unusual, since networks tend to develop spontaneously rather than consciously and
wind up less complete and neat). Moreover, given the partnership nature of the firm,
there does not appear to have been a board of directors, and so the essential structural
hole I am exploring could not have existed. The likelihood of such a situation
developing in a large public corporation, even one that is relatively flat in terms of
structure, is not high, so the focus on the CEO in that context seems perfectly
appropriate. See id.
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and public attention,45 its definition is both elusive and debated.
For purposes of this article, social capital, defined in its
minimal formulation, is the set of resources available to a
person, organization, or community that inheres in its social
structure.46 Social structure includes the webs—or networks—of
people and institutions that collectively constitute families,
friendships, organizations, communities, and societies.47
Although all treat social capital as a resource, the particular
understanding of how the resource works and where it is found
(in addition to whether it is more in the nature of a public good
or more in the nature of an individual asset) differs among the
various social capital theorists.
One of the earliest approaches to social capital was the
work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in the 1960s and
1970s. Bourdieu began from a distinctly anthropological
perspective, understanding culture as “a dynamic and creative,
but also a structured phenomenon.”48 His theory established a
triad of economic, cultural, and social capital, with economic
capital the most dominant factor.
James Coleman’s theory of social capital is a frank
attempt to draw together economics and sociology, originating
in his own theories of rational choice.49 Coleman asked how
human capital, which is educational attainment and skills,
affected the equality or inequality of persons in society.
Coleman theorized that social capital consisted of two parts:
first, the social structures themselves, and second, the way
they affected the actions of given actors within the structure.50
45

Largely due, most likely, to Robert Putnam’s 2000 book on the subject.
ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000). Bowling Alone follows upon Putnam’s earlier
work on social capital in Italy, ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK (1993).
46
At this point the functional definition of social capital as a resource seems
generally accepted. Frank & Yasumoto, supra note 42, at 645. The earliest use of the
term, adopting a definition similar to the one in the text (but in a different context)
appears to be by Glenn Loury. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY
300 (1990). See Glenn C. Loury, A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences, in
WOMEN, MINORITIES, AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 153 (Phyllis A. Wallace, ed.,
1977); Glenn C. Loury & John David Skrentny, Passing Strict Scrutiny: Using Social
Science to Design Affirmative Action Programs, 90 GEO. L.J. 835, 841 (2002).
47
Network theory itself has been recently popularized in DUNCAN E. WATTS,
SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2003) (laying out a new way to
understand the way networks grow, work, and how they drive collective behavior).
48
Tom Schuller et al., Social Capital: A Review and Critique, in SOCIAL
CAPITAL: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 3 (Stephen Baron et al., eds., 2000).
49
See generally James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human
Capital, 94 AM. J. SOC. 95 (1988) for an explication of his functionalist view of human
capital at a late stage in his career.
50
COLEMAN, supra note 46, at 302.
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Coleman’s argument focused on the way in which powerful
people remained powerful through their social networks with
other powerful people. Coleman also saw social capital itself as
a resource that could be manipulated through the creation of
social relations with other actors, including trust, obligations of
reciprocity, and specific social expectations. Given the common
understanding of human capital as the educational attainment
and skills of an actor, Coleman believed that social capital and
human capital were interrelated.51 The principal flaw in
Coleman’s work is the circularity of its conclusion—powerful
people tend to remain powerful because they are powerful
people, without a clear explanation of how they become
powerful in the first place.52
Robert Putnam, whose famous early work on social
capital derived from his study of regional governments in Italy,
noted a distinct difference in the performance of governments
in the north and south, leading him to focus on the extent to
which civic engagement made a difference in explaining the
greater effectiveness of northern governments.53 The particular
variables he examined were associational life, newspaper
reading, voter turnout, and voter preferences. He expanded his
examination of these variables in his book, Bowling Alone, in
which he looked at the decline in associations from bowling
leagues, coffee time with neighbors, sewing circles, and similar
activities, concluding that the level of civic engagement in the
United States had seriously declined. He hypothesized that
this decline was largely due to a dramatic increase in television
watching.54 The core of social capital, in Putnam’s definition,
lies in three factors: social networks, social norms, and trust.
Unlike Bourdieu and Coleman, who focused on the benefits of
social capital to the individual actor, Putnam took a more
global view. Thus, he treated social capital as a true public
good, essential to the maintenance of civic society, as is
foreshadowed by the title of his seminal work on Italy, Making
Democracy Work.55 This, of course, is not surprising given
Putnam’s training as a political scientist. In fact, the different
51

Schuller, supra note 46, at 6.
See COLEMAN, supra note 46.
53
See id.
54
It’s probably worth noting that criticism of Putnam’s empirical base and
social capital categories has become something of a cottage industry. It may be that
this has pushed him to a more instrumental view of social capital.
55
See COLEMAN, supra note 46
52
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professional backgrounds of these three major theorists of
social capital help to explain their understanding of the
importance of the concept, as illustrated by Bourdieu’s interest
in culture, Coleman’s in rational behavior, and Putnam’s in
democratic governance.56
Structural hole theory grows out of the confluence of
social capital theory with economic sociology. Social capital
theory and economic sociology—and thus a greater interest in
how social structure contributes to private goods—developed
along a somewhat parallel historical track. In the mid-1970s,
Mark Granovetter, working with the sociological tool of
network theory, which seeks to explain the ways in which
particular social structures affect relations among people,57
developed his seminal theory of “the strength of weak ties.”58
The paradox, Granovetter explained, was that network
theorists treated close relationships among people as the key
variable affecting their behavior, relationships that he
described as “strong ties.” But it was not these strong ties that
were essentially important in the economic realm. 59 Rather, he
found, most people surveyed found their jobs not through close
friends and family but through more casual acquaintances,
relationships he described as “weak ties.” The more weak ties a
person had, the broader and more far-reaching was her social
network, and thus the more likely it was that she could
maximize her own opportunities by exploiting those ties in
order to advance her career. Granovetter later retested this
hypothesis with somewhat mixed results,60 but the theory itself
has become one of the principal building blocks of economic
sociology. It should be clear that weak ties are a form of social
capital, a resource deriving from the social structure that
actors can use to better their positions and which actors can
56

As Putnam’s work has developed, his focus has shifted from pure
participation in associational life to the ways in which such participation develops
norms of reciprocity that form the core of social obligation. In other words, Putnam
seems to have moved from an understanding of social capital as more like public good
to social capital as more like a private resource, albeit necessarily sustained by the
social structure.
57
This is in contrast, for example, to the ways in which the structures of
particular institutions might affect behavior.
58
Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360
(1973).
59
Granovetter’s particular interest at the time was how people found work.
MARK S. GRANOVETTER, GETTING A JOB: A STUDY OF CONTACTS AND CAREERS (1974).
60
Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory
Revisited, in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 201 (Randall Collins ed., 1983).
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consciously seek to accumulate. As I will discuss, the theory of
structural holes begins in part with Granovetter’s theory.
Structural hole theory is a theory of social capital
because as it develops it takes the two component words of the
term quite literally. First, it is “social” in that the exploitive
opportunities of an actor derive from the social networks in
which he is embedded. Second, it is “capital” in that the actor’s
particular placement in that network—in the position
described as a structural hole—is, like weak ties, a resource
that can be used to maximize other resources by allowing the
actor to affect the terms of his own relationships with others.
While structural hole theory is a theory of social capital,
it is different from the work that I described earlier because of
its relentless instrumentality.61 Moreover, unlike much
sociological work, structural hole theory is not simply
descriptive, but is also predictive: based on extensive empirical
testing, Burt has identified the specific network structures and
hierarchies that allow us to predict things like which managers
in a given corporation will advance at the fastest rate. The
ideal network structure for this purpose varies with the age,
gender, and duration of a particular manager’s employment.62
This predictive aspect of the theory can also help us
determine the best structures of governance for public
corporations by allowing us to see how given social structures
are defective. That is, structure reveals informational and
control opportunities which network (in our case, corporate)
actors could use either to the advantage or disadvantage of the
corporation while serving themselves. The theory further
provides insight into how we might alter structures to prevent
the proliferation of these locii of self-interest or, to the extent
they are desirable, increase them. It is for this reason that
structural hole theory holds great promise as a tool for focusing

61

This isn’t terribly surprising since Burt studied with Coleman. Richard
Swedberg, Major Traditions of Economic Sociology, 17 ANN. REV. SOC. 251, 269 (1991).
Swedberg’s own theories, based on theories of rational choice, were themselves
instrumental. Burt’s work, while serious and scholarly, sometimes reads like a
sociological version of How to Succeed in Business Without Really Trying.
62
Burt’s empirical data were derived from his study of “one of America’s
largest high-technology firms.” BURT, supra note 27, at 118. He later used what
appears from his description to be the same firm in his refinement of the theory
although he reports data from other studies in this article. Ronald S. Burt, The
Contingent Value of Social Capital, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 339 (1997). He based his study of
market competition and structural holes on seventy-seven product markets as
classified by the U.S. Department of Commerce. BURT, supra note 27, at 85.
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the debates over the most effective methods of corporate
governance.
Burt’s theory of structural holes developed from the
groundwork of Granovetter’s theory of weak ties.63 Recall that
Granovetter saw the weakness of social ties as a correlate of
information flows that enables actors with weak ties to have
access to information that they otherwise would not. Burt’s
departure from Granovetter’s theory rests on two aspects of
that theory. First is the issue of causation. What is causative of
the effectiveness of weak ties, he argues, is not the strength or
weakness of the particular ties themselves, but of the
structural holes they span64 (or the opportunity presented by
the structural hole for an entrepreneur to place himself in the
middle of potential information flows among networks). The
second is that Burt finds that the strength or weakness of the
ties does not matter—information flows over both. The relevant
question for Burt is whether or not those ties are redundant
(which, as I will later explain, means whether they efficiently
and effectively reach the same people or whether they reach
new networks).
Burt criticizes Granovetter’s theory by arguing that “the
weak tie argument obscures the control benefits of structural
holes.”65 The theory of weak ties is about bridges—about the
paths along which information flows. The structural hole
argument is about “chasms”—the interruptions of those flows.66
The person who can see the chasm and bridge it is in a position
not only to receive information, but to control the information
flows himself, regardless of whether the tie is weak or strong.
III.

WHAT IS A “STRUCTURAL HOLE”?

With this brief introduction to the development and
basic insight of structural hole theory, it is time now to explain

63

BURT, supra note 27, at 26-28.
Id. at 26-27.
65
Id. at 28. Burt is not always clear about whether structural holes are
spaces in the social structure or intersections of networks that occur within
individuals. My best reading is that he means they are both. Compare id. at 190, 192
(describing structural holes as relations that intersect). I don’t believe that the
ambiguity is at all important. Structural holes, it appears, can be both gaps unfilled
between or among networks, or the gap once filled. The important point is that the
possibility of filling the gap creates the competitive opportunities that are the essence
of structural holes.
66
Id. at 28.
64
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some of the technical aspects of the theory.67 A structural hole
is a bridge between nonredundant contacts.68 Nonredundancy is
characterized by the presence of two criteria: lack of cohesion
and lack of structural equivalence. Cohesion refers to the
strength of the relationship in question. Strong relationships
signal that no structural hole exists. Burt provides examples of
cohesive ties as between father and son or husband and wife. If
either one of the actors in that relationship is a strong contact
of yours, you effectively have access to the other person. Think
of a group of close friends who live in the same neighborhood,
travel together, and meet socially on a regular basis. A strong
tie with one of these friends, in effect, gives you access to the
information possessed by the entire network.69 Leaving aside
information that is understood by the group to remain
confidential within it, contact with one is contact with all.70
There is no gap in the network for you to occupy. As a result,
you derive no informational benefits (although you might
derive social pleasure) from establishing ties to other members
of the group. The relationship is characterized by cohesion and
is therefore redundant. Figure Two illustrates this idea.

67

The theory itself is rather complex, although it depends upon one central,
fairly simple, insight. The complexity of the theory lies more in its various implications
than in the concept itself. I have thus drawn on the centrally important aspects of the
theory as being those that are relevant to an initial explication of the problems of
corporate governance in an attempt to avoid complicating the story and confusing the
reader with details that, at this point, are only of subsidiary importance.
68
BURT, supra note 27, at 17-18.
69
Limited, although Burt disregards this, by norms of confidentiality and
perhaps somewhat tempered by in-group psychology. For a recent application of ingroup psychological theory see generally O’Connor, supra note 12. One of the gaps in
Burt’s work, as I read it, is his failure to account for the role of group norms in
regulating behavior within networks. However, this appears to be quite intentional and
characteristic of the structural approach taken by Burt, because it also provides one of
the virtues of the structural approach, in its relentless empiricism based on observable
facts (which norms, beliefs, and values are not). Sociologists working in the general
area of structural equivalence (of which structural hole theory is an example) have
been criticized for failing to account for actors’ “beliefs, values, and normative
commitments.” Mustafa Emirbayer & Jeff Goodwin, Network Analysis, Culture, and
the Problem of Agency, 99 AM. J. SOC. 1411, 1425 (1994). See generally Frank &
Yasumoto, supra note 42, for a more norms based social capital approach to
competition and cooperation within competitive networks.
70
The likelihood of information moving from one member of the group to
another is a direct function of the strength of their ties. BURT, supra note 27, at 18-19.
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Cohesion

Structural equivalence refers to people who have the
same contacts. Take the group of friends mentioned earlier. Let
us assume you have contacts with Ivan and Alyosha. If Ivan
and Alyosha each have contacts with Fyodor and Dmitri, Ivan
and Alyosha are structurally equivalent—your connections
with Fyodor and Dmitri are indirect, but redundant through
Ivan and Alyosha. You can magnify the structural equivalence
even further if Fyodor and Dmitri each have contacts with
Adelaida and Sofya. Your contacts with Ivan and Alyosha do
nothing to increase your network advantages. Each provides
you with exactly the same network benefits as your own tie to
the other. Figure Three is an illustration of this point.
Figure 3:

Structural Equivalence

Once we have determined that your contacts are neither
cohesive nor redundant, we turn to the question of the
efficiency and effectiveness of the network ties provided by
your contacts. An efficient network is one in which you
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maximize your nonredundant ties in a particular network (that
is, ties that lack coherence and structural equivalence). It does
you no good to maintain contact with members of the same
network, since this produces precisely the redundancy you are
trying to avoid. Maximizing your nonredundant ties maximizes
the number of structural holes you get for each contact. In
other words, you can maintain contact with the same number
of people (that is, the network), at significantly lower cost by
focusing your energies on only one primary contact in the
network.71 As is implied by the concept of economic efficiency
upon which Burt draws, such an approach allows you to
maintain your contacts at the lowest possible cost.
For example, assume that you know Ivan and Alyosha,
who also know each other. You also know Fyodor and Dmitri,
who know each other but neither of whom know Ivan or
Alyosha. You are wasting your time maintaining all four
contacts. You’re far better off forgetting about Alyosha and
Dmitri. Your contact with Ivan gives you access to information
from Alyosha, and your contact with Fyodor gives you access to
information from Dmitri. By transferring your energies from
all four contacts only to Ivan and Fyodor, you have increased
the efficiency of your networks by maintaining four contacts for
the cost of two. The time saved by dropping your contact with
Alyosha and Dmitri can be used to expand your network by
making other contacts. Figures Four and Five illustrate an
inefficient and efficient network.
Figure 4:

71

Network Inefficiency

There is an additional element necessary to create the efficient network as
Burt discusses, and that is to select the right person in each network with whom to
make contact. This largely turns on the question of who you think you can most trust
in the network to provide you with timely and accurate information. Burt also notes
that network efficiencies imply that you should choose as your contact not only the
most trustworthy member of the group but the one with whom contact is easiest to
maintain and who is most likely to reciprocate personal favors. Id. at 20-21.
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Network Efficiency

This concept of nonredundancy explains why the
existence of structural holes might increase corporate
efficiency. The greater the extent to which managers are
connected only to primary contacts in a network, the less time
they waste by spending it with people who will provide
redundant information. In order to see this, simply take the
preceding example and imagine that Ivan and Alyosha, and
Fyodor and Dmitri, respectively work in different divisions of
the corporation. By dropping Alyosha and Dmitri, you get the
same informational benefits with less work. To the extent that
bureaucracies are information-producing organizations, using
structure to achieve this result is a relatively low-cost way of
improving the efficiency of this informational function. There
is, however, a tradeoff for this increased efficiency, as I will
later demonstrate. The corporation that undertakes to create
structural holes may do so at its peril.
Network effectiveness is about increasing the total size of
your network. The concept mandates that you deploy your
resources efficiently by maintaining your primary contact, thus
enabling you to use the remainder of your resources to
establish and maintain primary contacts in different networks.
Doing so, you will maximize the total size of your network by
connecting to people who themselves have connections to other
networks. In effect, you ideally choose one primary contact, and
you leave to this person the job of developing and maintaining
the cluster of contacts that form his network.72 In a sense, you
72

Burt is not entirely clear as to whether you should choose primary contacts
who have the largest networks or choose primary contacts and maintain them while
they build their networks by including more people (which increases your number of
secondary contacts, and thus total contacts). The ambiguity arises from his assertion in
the text that the primary contact maintains the network. Id. at 21. His diagram shows
you maintaining the same number of primary contacts, but with their networks
growing, which he also describes as the goal of network effectiveness. Id. at 20-23. I
believe the second reading is more consistent with his theory and it is the reading I
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are using your primary contact to diversify your network
portfolio, while at the same time she increases it. Because you
are the bridge among various networks, you receive
information from one network that might be desirable to
members of other networks. You are thus in a position to use
that information as you see fit, or to use it (as we will later see)
to manipulate the various networks to which you are
connected. Network effectiveness contrasts with network
efficiency. Network efficiency diminishes the cost of
maintaining networks for each contact. Network effectiveness
increases the overall size of your network.
Choosing effective contacts means choosing contacts in
each network who are the most likely to make contacts with
others. If they are not, they are probably not good choices for
helping you to establish an effective network. Similarly, you
should choose the contact in each network who is likely to be
the most trustworthy and loyal to you. It is this combination of
ability to build their own networks, trust, and loyalty in your
primary contacts that enables you to build an effective
network. As an example, assume that you know Ivan and
Alyosha, neither of whom knows the other. Ivan and Alyosha
become acquainted with Fyodor and Dmitri, respectively.
Fyodor and Dmitri respectively become acquainted with
Adelaida and Sofya. And Adelaida and Sofya become
acquainted, respectively, with Pyotr and Vorokhov. Simply by
maintaining your primary contact with Ivan and Alyosha, your
network has expanded from two contacts to eight contacts.
Assuming they are trustworthy and loyal, Ivan and Alyosha
are effective primary contacts. This is an effective network.
While Ivan and Alyosha grow and maintain their networks,
you are free to seek out other primary contacts. Now assume
that you meet Ahab. From your conversation with him, you
learn that the only other contact he has is Moby and, given
your assessment of his personality, you don’t believe he is
likely to expand his network beyond Moby. This is reason
enough for you not to establish primary contact with him (not
to mention your suspicions about his trustworthiness and
loyalty). You are far better off using your energy to make a
more promising additional primary contact. Figure Six
illustrates network effectiveness.

present in the text.
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Figure 6:

There are several situations in which network efficiency
is not optimal. One, specifically mentioned by Burt, is a dense
cluster of resources, like a board of directors and a CEO. The
other is friendship networks because, in Burt’s felicitous
phrasing, “Judging friends on the basis of efficiency is an
interpersonal flatulence from which friends will flee.”73 As he
says with respect to networks like the board:
These clusters are so important to the vitality of the rest of the
network that it is worth treating each person in them as a primary
contact, regardless of redundancy. Saturation [the phrase he uses to
describe such networks] minimizes the risk of losing effective contact
with the cluster and minimizes the risk of missing an important
opportunity anywhere in the cluster.74

As I will later discuss, while treating the board as a
saturated cluster (a single network in which the actor has ties
to each member) may be important to the CEO’s success, it has
more nefarious implications as well.
Thus far we have principally focused on the
informational benefits of structural holes. There is, however, a
second benefit of structural hole theory—control.75 Effectively
73

Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 25.
75
As with the efficiency-increasing properties of structural holes for
information flows within organizations, the control benefits of structural holes may
74
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exploiting a structural hole allows you to manipulate various
networks to which you are connected (or individual people who
are nonredundant contacts) by playing them off against one
another in two different ways. The first way is exemplified by a
simple economic transaction. Assume that you want to sell
your house and you have two bidders. Clearly you can increase
the price you will receive if you encourage them to bid against
one another.76 Fostering this type of bidding war ties the control
advantage of structural holes to the informational advantage
previously discussed.
The second kind of control benefit occurs when one is
situated between two players who have conflicting desires. This
can occur, for example, when an associate in a law firm is
working on major deals with two different partners, both of
which heat up simultaneously, leaving each partner to compete
for the associate’s time. The associate is in a position to play
one off the other to his advantage. Robert Merton describes an
actor in the associate’s position as “a more or less influential
bystander”77 whose function is to make the partners’ conflicting
demands their problem rather than the associate’s problem.
(This is similar to the role of a child in a two parent family).
Both strategies have implications for the structure of corporate
governance.
All of this sounds terribly manipulative, and one might
reasonably ask again what using structural hole theory to
analyze corporate governance adds to the already rich tool box
of neoclassical and behavioral economics. After all, these
approaches assume manipulative or opportunistic actors. And
the theory resembles one that describes ways in which actors
can maximize their wealth by becoming social capital
entrepreneurs.
also increase efficiency depending upon the way they are exploited by the actor who
identifies them.
76
All the better if neither knows the other’s bid—this often can get you a
higher price than you would otherwise receive because their lack of information may
lead one to bid more than is necessary to beat the other. Real estate brokers in hot
markets have caught on to this idea by including escalation clauses in their clients’
contracts which set up an auction among multiple bidders. Such contracts specify
incremental increases in bidding price a potential buyer is willing to offer in a contest
to obtain a house and is usually capped at some amount. Such clauses have become de
rigueur in parts of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.
77
ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 431 (1968).
The technical term for such a person is a tertius gaudens from an Italian proverb
meaning “one who benefits.” I avoid the use of the term in the text to avoid introducing
jargon unnecessary to the paper.
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But the theory does add significantly to these other
methodologies.
First,
it
eliminates the
neoclassical
presumption that actors are autonomous and that the dyadic
transaction is the appropriate focus of inquiry. Actors are not
autonomous—they are embedded in social networks, and for all
of its occasional reversion to neoclassicism, structural hole
theory advances considerably beyond asocial neoclassical
approaches by explaining the ways in which networks are
themselves the sources of competition. Gaps in the network
facilitate competition by creating opportunities to obtain
positional advantages.
In addition, structural hole theory provides a powerful
alternative to neoclassical analysis by eliding the need to
identify wealth (or anything else for that matter) as a
maximand.78 People behave entrepreneurially for a variety of
reasons: for instance, the simple psychological desire to
succeed, the fun of the game, and the maximization of wealth,
among others. Burt believes that clarifying opportunities is
motivation enough in and of itself. That is to say, given two
opportunities an actor will take the clearer path.79 Thus, Burt
treats motive and opportunity as equivalents.80 This may
appear to be a cop-out; after all, the manipulative behavior
observed and, to some extent, prescribed by, structural hole
theory is unpleasant to many of us.81 Moreover, the
opportunities described are frequently, if coincidentally, wealth
maximizing opportunities.82
78

In this respect it also advances beyond transaction cost economics which
remains mired in neoclassical assumptions about motivations and goals.
79
BURT, supra note 27, at 35.
80
Id. at 35-36.
81
Burt effectively admits that this stance is a cop-out. “I am begging the
question of how opportunity and motivation are connected. I emphasize the causal
priority of opportunity. The opposite emphasis is traditional in sociology. . . . Here I
emphasize opportunity because I can analyze it in a rigorous way with network
concepts and describe a great variety of empirical events.” Id. at 275 n.13. His
dispensation with concerns of motivation (although they do appear in Chapter Seven)
isn’t especially troubling for my purposes because the point of this project is to develop
a purely structural analysis that can identify particular points of weakness or strength
within the corporate structure.
Others, however, believe that structural instrumentalists like Burt
actually rely upon utility maximization. See Emirbayer & Goodwin, supra note 69, at
1428.
82
Some of this may derive from Burt’s use of American institutions as his
empirical base. This practice embeds his theory in a society which, at least in the
economic realm, has come to embody many of the characteristics described by the
neoclassical model. See Nicole Woolsey Biggart & Gary G. Hamilton, On the Limits of a
Firm-Based Theory to Explain Business Networks: The Western Bias of Neoclassical
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For purposes of this article and its focus on the CEO
(who has already demonstrated network entrepreneurship by
climbing the corporate ladder), it may be enough to leave the
question of motivation open, since control is central to
structural hole theory and control is, after all, the job and goal
of the CEO.83 But for those who demand a maximand in order to
appreciate a theory, perhaps we can make do for purposes of
this discussion with maximization of control as the behavioral
motivation. For the broader uses of structural hole theory
(perhaps even broader uses within the context of analyzing
corporate behavior at lower levels, or at the board level), it is
enough to say that—at least in its descriptive and, in my
adaptation of it, diagnostic aspects—structural hole theory
needs no particular motivational assumption in order to enable
us to examine organizational structure. Thus, our goal is to
identify, as points of weakness, holes that can be occupied by
actors who are then able to manipulate corporate behavior or to
control information flows in ways that may be disadvantageous
to the corporation. Whether or not corporate actors take
advantage of the opportunities provided by structural holes,
the important observation is the manner in which structure
creates these opportunities. In this way, structural holes can be
seen as a source of freedom obtained by opening up networks,
where desirable, to either permit a freer flow of information or
to destroy the possibility of control monopolies. Whatever the
motivation of particular actors might be, the opportunities that
are created by network structure can be used for good or ill (or
not used at all). Knowing where they are and their potential
Economics, in NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 44, at 471, 488. See also
GRANOVETTER, supra note 59, at 447 (noting that rational or instrumental behavior
aims not only at economic goals but also “at sociability, approval, status, and power”).
On the other hand, the structural equivalence approach to sociology of which Burt’s
work is an example has been criticized for conceptualizing actors in “narrowly utilitymaximizing and instrumental ways.” Emirbayer & Goodwin, supra note 69, at 1425. I
do not find this especially troubling, despite my personal distaste for neoclassical
analysis, because these motivations, while perhaps implicit (especially in economic
sociological work) are not necessary aspects of the theory which itself relies solely upon
structure. So while narrow instrumentalism might be implicit in a structuralist
account, it is tangential and irrelevant to the explanatory power of the theory. For a
motivational account analyzing the interrelationship between structure and
psychological motivation, see James N. Baron & Jeffrey Pfeffer, The Social Psychology
of Organizations and Inequality, 57 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 190 (1994).
83
Harrison C. White, Agency as Control in Formal Networks, in NETWORKS
AND ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 44, at 92. (“To manage is to make use of ties. To gain
and maintain control requires attending to networks of ties.”) The classic work on the
subject of the role of the CEO is CHESTER BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE
(1938).
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effects allows us greater insight into appropriate organizational
design.
IV.

THE APPLICATION OF STRUCTURAL HOLE THEORY TO
PROBLEMS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Corporations are webs of social networks. The power of
an actor in a social network depends more on his connections
between networks than on his position within a given network.
Simply put, the corporate actor with the most nonredundant
network contacts (who has bridged the greatest number of
structural holes) is better positioned to monopolize information,
engender competition between networks or other actors (i.e.,
the house auction), and control the behavior of other actors
(i.e., the university president and the law firm associate),
which may translate into the ability to determine his own
power and profit. These opportunities are available to him
because, by taking advantage of structural holes, he effectively
becomes the sole vector of a variety of separate networks,84 a
position that gives him substantial autonomy in managing
intracorporate relations and, as a consequence, his own
position in the corporation.85
The basic aspects of structural hole theory and their
applicability to the problem of corporate boards should now be
clear. Prior to the 1980s, most public corporation boards were
comprised of a majority of non-independent directors.86 The
tradition of inside directors (or at least directors with
substantial ties to the corporation and corporate management
below the level of CEO87) began in the early stages of
bureaucratic corporate growth and persisted into the 1980s.
These directors were, generally, high level executives of the
corporation or so-called “gray” directors: the corporation’s
bankers or lawyers who regularly worked with upper
management.88 Whatever the problems of these inside directors,
84

This is a bit of an oversimplification, but suffices for purposes of discussion.
For a more complex depiction, see BURT, supra note 27, at 22 fig. 1.4, which illustrates
the process of optimizing your structural holes.
85
See id. at 45-49; Burt, supra note 62. See also Mark S. Granovetter, The
Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 (1973)
86
Bhagat & Black, supra note 15, at 238.
87
These are commonly referred to as “affiliated directors” and are typically
professionals like lawyers and investment bankers, whose day to day work with the
corporation typically involves substantial and sustained contact with executives other
than the CEO.
88
Gray directors are typically classified as a form of outside director. I depart
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real or perceived, the very nature of their relationships with
the corporation ensured that they had ties to corporate
managers below the level of CEO. Put in terms of network
theory, they had ties to networks that were independent of the
CEO. Thus the number of nonredundant corporate contacts
they had, and therefore their access to corporate information,
was not dependent solely upon the CEO. These ties to networks
below the CEO gave them independent access to corporate
information, putting them in a position to verify information
provided by the CEO (whether or not they actually took
advantage of it by challenging the CEO).
Beginning in the 1980s, the number of inside directors
on corporate boards began to diminish as corporate boards
moved toward independence. This shift was spurred, in part, by
two developments.89 First, the American Law Institute adopted
its Principles of Corporate Governance, which initially
advocated independent directors (directors without personal or
financial ties to the corporation) in a variety of contexts.
Although the ALI took a more moderate position in its final
draft,90 the Principles do envision a “monitoring” board with a
substantial number of independent directors, a concept which
itself implies substantial directorial independence. Second, the
Delaware Supreme Court, in fighting its way through a whirl
of takeovers, tried to develop doctrine appropriate to evaluate
boards’ fulfillment of their fiduciary obligations. The Court
noted repeatedly that boards dominated by independent
directors were likely to receive more deference than boards
with a substantial number of inside directors.91 As finance came
from this usage because, with respect to the problem I’m discussing, they are situated
more like inside directors than independent directors who are true outside directors.
89
Westphal and Zajac have noted the substantial increase in boards
dominated by outside directors. James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Defections from
the Inner Circle: Social Exchange, Reciprocity, and the Diffusion of Board Independence
in U.S. Corporations, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 161 (1997).
90
The moderation largely was a result of political pressure from large firm
lawyers protecting their perception of their clients’ interests.
91
See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1154 (Del. 1989); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del.
1988); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corporation, 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del.
1987); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 n.3 (Del.
1986); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985). There may also
be a sociological dimension to the proliferation of outside boards. Gerald Davis and
Henrich Greve, examining the spread of golden parachutes and poison pills among
corporations, look to network theory to explain how the adoption of these devices may
well be attributable to information flows through interlocking directorates. Gerald F.
Davis & Henrich R. Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the
1980s, 103 AM. J. SOC. 1 (1997). The same mechanism might at least in part have been
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to dominate management and the intercorporate transaction
became an important tool of continued corporate development,
the need for corporations to be free of fiduciary taint increased.
Boards became increasingly independent.92 Finally, the
corporate scandals of 2002 led not only to the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, with its emphasis on directorial
independence, but also to New York Stock Exchange reforms
requiring listed corporations to have a majority of independent
directors. Other business associations joined in advocating
largely independent boards as well.93 With directorial
independence, and the absence of corporate insiders other than
the CEO and perhaps one other executive on the corporate
board, directors began to lose their network ties into the
corporate structure. Ties with managers and other corporate
insiders were eliminated, and replaced by a single tie into the
network, the CEO.94 As a result, directors became more
dependent on the CEO for their information. Directors were not
left completely isolated. Executives themselves belong to
networks of other executives that tend to produce institutional
conformity among corporations.95 The relatively small number
of directors of large American corporations compared to the
total number of corporations suggests some degree of director
overlap. In addition, a substantial subset of directors are CEOs
of their own corporations, which provides them with significant
network ties outside of the particular corporations they serve.
While this may produce a level of conformity among directors,
it does not itself suggest that the majority of independent
directors have network ties within a given corporation beyond
the CEO and any other insider who happens to sit on the
board.
responsible for the spread of outside boards.
92
See the survey data in Bhagat & Black, supra note 15, at 239.
93
Other organizations, like the Business Roundtable, have jumped on the
bandwagon. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1997).
The Business Roundtable is composed of leading CEOs. Their support for independent
boards should not be surprising once one understands that this is entirely in their selfinterest.
94
But see James D. Westphal, Collaboration in the Boardroom: Behavioral
and Performance Consequences of CEO-Board Social Ties, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 7, 16
(1999) (finding empirical evidence that corporations with CEO social ties to board
members improve collaboration and advice seeking and that such corporations show
improved performance).
95
See Glenn R. Carroll & Albert C. Teo, On the Social Networks of Managers,
39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 421 (1996); Marta A. Geletkanycz & Donald C. Hambrick, The
External Ties of Top Executives: Implications for Strategic Choice and Performance, 42
ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 654 (1997).
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These observations, in light of the insights provided by
structural hole theory, suggest two hypotheses:
1. Corporations that have inside boards96 will have a
weak CEO; and
2. Corporations that have independent boards will have
a strong CEO.
These hypotheses are counterintuitive and contrary to
most of the accepted wisdom of corporate scholarship.97 It has
long been an article of faith, as well as accepted by corporate
scholarship98 and in caselaw,99 that corporations with inside
boards have the strongest CEOs.100 Insiders, dependent for their
jobs on the good will of the CEO, are unlikely to oppose him.
This argument is fundamentally flawed. It assumes that the
work of the board actually takes place at the board level. As a
number of studies have demonstrated,101 this simply is not true.
To the extent that board members seek to challenge CEOs,
they tend to do so in discussions outside of the board meeting.
And, if confrontation with the CEO is to occur, it does so either
informally or is choreographed in advance by the dissidents.
While I lack evidence to substantiate this point, it follows
logically that challenges to the CEO would be posed by
independent directors, if at all. But the clear implication of
network theory is that the independent directors will have
received the information to challenge the CEO from their
relationships, established on the board, with inside directors
whose networks extend deep into the corporate hierarchy. By
virtue of these relationships, the independent directors have
sources of information independent of the CEO. They need not
rely upon the kind or quality of the information the CEO
96

By “inside board” I do not mean to suggest that the board is exclusively or,
even necessarily mostly, composed of insiders, only that a significant number of
insiders other than the CEO sit on the board.
97
But see note 14 and accompanying text, for recent questioning of the
desirability of independent boards and attention to CEO power in relation to the board.
Although none of these studies provides a direct connection between independent
boards and CEO power (although Westphal, supra note 19, comes close), they clearly
intuit the problem. The hypotheses not only clearly identify the problem but provide an
explanation for these intuitions.
98
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
99
See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT & DAVID F. CRAVERS, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE
ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (West 2004) (2003).
100
But see the work done on the relationship between independent boards and
executive compensation cited supra note 14.
101
The classic, if dated, studies are JAY LORSCH & EVELYN MACIVER, PAWNS
OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS (1989) and MYLES L.
MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971).
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presents. Given this greater access, the directors on an inside
board, whether inside or independent, will be in a better
position to challenge the CEO (even if the challenge is fronted
by the independent directors to shield the inside directors from
termination or retaliation for perceived disloyalty to the CEO).
Hypothesis one is illustrated by Figure Seven.
Figure 7:

Corporations that have inside boards will have
weak CEOs

Hypothesis two suggests that in a corporation with an
independent board, the CEO will be strong. The reason should
by now be obvious. Unlike the corporation with an inside board,
containing members with substantial network ties into the
corporate hierarchy—the corporation with an independent
board has only one structural hole between the subordinate
managers and the board. In other words, when the board is
completely independent, the nonredundant contacts bridging
structural holes between the corporation and the members of
the board do not exist. The single structural hole is bridged by
the CEO, who, as the only contact between managers and the
board, is the board’s sole source of information.102 Unless a
102

Unless of course the CEO chooses to present insiders at board meetings or
facilitate their contact with independent board members. It would, it seems, be
irrational for a CEO to do this because in so doing he relinquishes his informational
monopoly and the full power of his control position.
Of course auditors may provide a source of financial information to the
board independent of the CEO. But the work of auditors is typically done in
conjunction with management and, following Sarbanes-Oxley, we can expect the CEO
to have an active role in the process of preparing audited financial statements.
Moreover, the corporate scandals of 2002 demonstrated that independent auditors have
greater incentives to please their employer than to provide truly independent audits.
While this is likely to change, it only mitigates the problem at issue—it does not
eliminate it.
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subordinate manager has independent network ties to one or
more of the independent directors, only the CEO is in a position
to control and manipulate information flows to the board. This
leaves the CEO in an enormously powerful position, with every
incentive to present information to the board in a light that is
most favorable to him.103 The board is constrained by the
information the CEO chooses to present and how he chooses to
present it.104 Consequently, the CEO in a corporation with an
independent board should be strong.105 The following figure
illustrates hypothesis two.
Figure 8:

Corporations that have independent boards will
have strong CEOs

It should therefore come as no surprise that there is
some (albeit disputed) evidence that CEOs with independent
boards tend to receive the highest compensation.106 But the
reason may not be, as some suggest, the board’s lack of
sophistication with respect to option pricing and a consequent

103

Langevoort, supra note 5, at 812 discusses the CEO’s incentive to
manipulate information to outside directors. See also Westphal, supra note 19
(discussing and analyzing CEO ingratiation and persuasion to offset the power of
outside directors).
104
Westphal, supra note 19, provides empirical support for what he calls
greater CEO ingratiation and persuasion behavior where the corporation has an
independent board. Ingratiation and persuasion may not rise to the level of
manipulation, but they’re not far removed from it.
105
This helps to explain the superior bargaining position of the CEO in
compensation matters observed by Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, as well as suggest
opportunities for the CEO to engage in what they interestingly describe as
“camouflaging” his compensation package. Id. at 789.
106
The empirical evidence is mixed on whether this is accurate. See supra
note 23 and accompanying text.
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tendency to be overly generous with options.107 Instead, the
reason may be that the independent board is reliant upon the
CEO for information with respect to his own performance,
information that can easily be manipulated or suppressed by
the CEO because of his position as the sole source of
information.108 This also may explain Bhagat and Black’s
evidence that independent boards do not necessarily improve
corporate performance and may in fact make it worse.109
Finally, and perhaps most powerfully, it may account for one of
the principal ways in which opportunities for executive
misbehavior—and resulting corporate scandals—are created.
As the sole bridge between corporate management and the
board the CEO is put in an enormously powerful position. He
has a monopoly over the information delivered to the body
ultimately responsible for the integrity of corporate
management and information.110
At this juncture, it is important to note some
qualifications. Corporations of any size, and especially public
corporations, are highly complex. As they face a variety of
different challenges, there will be exceptions to the hypotheses.
One clear case, presented in Joy v. North,111 is where a CEO has
an insider dominated board that he has, by force of personality,
largely subjugated to his control. Or, a corporation with an
independent board may have directors who themselves possess
sufficiently strong personalities as to insist upon verifying the
information presented by the CEO.112 There are also certain
107

See Murphy, supra note 14.
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker recognize this problem, supra note 5. See also
Novaes & Zingales, supra note 41 (discussing the relationship between bureaucratic
structure and compensation arrangements).
109
Bhagat & Black, supra note 15, at 263.
110
This does not mean that the CEO is unconstrained. Obviously the CEO
will be dependent for his information on the information supplied to him by his
subordinates. This can create its own informational problems, as I discuss infra Part
VI.
111
692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982). This is likely to be a relatively rare situation.
Persons—even insiders—who sit on corporate boards tend to be powerful and highly
successful in their own right, and while psychological theories, as well as studies of
director selection, suggest that these directors are or become friendly to the CEO, the
situation in which directors are complete pushovers is unlikely to be frequent.
112
This may well be increasingly the case, strong personalities or not, in light
of the recent corporate scandals in which various boards were accused of failing to pay
proper attention to internal corporate transactions, like the conflict of interest
transactions approved by the board in the Enron case. WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR., 107TH
CONGRESS., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 1-17 (Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter POWERS
REPORT].
108
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types of transactions, like board-authorized compensation, for
which an inside board may be beneficial to the CEO
(particularly if the compensation plan simultaneously benefits
the senior managers who sit on the board).113 Other types of
transactions, like takeover situations, may focus the board (at
least in part because of potential legal sanctions for failing to
fulfill their duties in highly visible transactions), such that
they become more demanding of verified information (as, for
example, in the employment of investment bankers to give
fairness opinions). And a situation such as a corporation in
reorganization may result in a grant of extraordinary power to
the CEO (or result in a new CEO with such power),
notwithstanding board composition or corporate structure.
Nonetheless, for ordinary monitoring situations of the type that
evidently failed in the recent corporate scandals, the
hypotheses hold as a theoretical matter.114
Finally, I recognize that in basing the hypotheses on a
wholly independent board (except of course for the CEO), I am
relying on an ideal type that may not exist in practice. But
using the ideal type allows us to clarify the problems an
independent board faces with respect to the CEO, and
formulate better questions for analysis.
V.

EXTENDING THE IMPLICATIONS—SENIOR MANAGERS

It should be apparent that what holds true for the CEO
has the potential, under the right circumstances, to hold true
for senior managers. For purposes of this paper, I define senior
managers as those executives who are the CEO’s immediate
subordinates and, depending upon the corporation’s internal
structure, the managers directly below them.
In order for senior managers to seize the opportunities
presented by structural holes at the top of the corporate
structure, at least one of several conditions must exist. One
potential condition is that the CEO, despite his rank, is a poor
network player, either because of his inability to recognize
structural holes or because he has allowed them to proliferate
113

The evidence on whether independent or inside boards overcompensate
CEOs is disputed. Even in these circumstances, the CEO’s ability to control
information about his own performance with respect to an independent board may give
him an edge.
114
I know this is the typical law professor’s cop-out but I am truly unequipped
to do this kind of empirical work. I do hope, in the not too distant future, to find a way
to conduct adequate empirical testing of the hypotheses.
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at high levels. Another is that one or more senior executives
might collude with the CEO in order to control and manipulate
information with respect to the board. A third possibility is
that the CEO intentionally creates structural holes in order to
separate himself from the manipulation of information and
control that would then be possible at the senior manager level.
A final condition would be that the senior executives are good
network players, with efficient and effective networks within
the corporate hierarchy, and the ability to identify structural
hole opportunities. Several examples will illustrate the
existence of these conditions and the resulting possibilities for
senior management misconduct.
The poster child of corporate scandals, the Enron fiasco,
presents the first example. The facts of the decline and fall of
Enron are well known. Enron engaged in a number of offbalance sheet transactions which, contrary to generally
accepted accounting principles, it failed to disclose, resulting in
highly overstated earnings and highly understated assets.
Moreover, some of the transactions engaged in were shams.
These transactions provided certain executives (most notably
Andrew Fastow, the corporation’s chief financial officer, and
some of his subordinates), with opportunities for rich rewards.
The collapse of Enron resulted in an internal investigation115
and well-publicized congressional hearings116 which involved
the testimony of a number of the Enron participants.
Most striking in both the reports and the hearings were
CEO Jeff Skilling’s continuous denials of knowledge of the
transactions, their financial structures, and the extent of
Fastow’s conflicts of interest and profit opportunities. (Some of
the transactions took place under the watch of Skilling’s
predecessor CEO, Kenneth Lay, who refused to testify. The
Powers report suggests the extent to which Lay may have
lacked knowledge.)117 Particularly striking was Skilling’s
congressional testimony, under oath, that he was not aware of
the mayhem transpiring beneath him in the managerial ranks.

115

POWERS REPORT, supra note 112.
The Collapse of the Enron Corporation: Full Committee Hearings Before the
State Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 107th Cong. Part IV (Feb. 26, 2002)
(testimony of Jeffrey Skilling).
117
The Powers report is critical of the board, which evidently approved certain
transactions on the basis of incomplete knowledge. POWERS REPORT, supra note 112, at
1-17. This of course is consistent with the notion that boards lacking strong network
ties into the corporate hierarchy are more easily manipulated.
116
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The Powers report also suggests that Skilling may have been
uninformed at some level.118
The common wisdom, I believe, was that Skilling and
perhaps Lay were lying.119 But it may well be that Skilling was
telling the truth. How could a chief operating officer (later
CEO) be so ignorant of what his immediate subordinates were
doing? One answer is that Skilling, a highly accomplished
network player, created a structural hole between himself and
Fastow, which he intentionally left unbridged. This break
established chains of command and reporting systems designed
to stop with Fastow. Information would only reach Skilling
selectively, if at all. If this was the case, it is a superb example
of how a CEO can create a structural hole in order to protect
himself from potential liability.
Why would a CEO do this? In Skilling’s case, the answer
may be because he needed Fastow’s manipulations in order to
maintain Enron’s appearance as a highly valuable and
continually growing corporation. That, after all, is what the offbalance sheet transactions were designed to do. The price for
Fastow’s cooperation may well have been the enormous
compensation he received for his role in managing these
entities. Assuming Skilling was aware both of Fastow’s skill (as
he undoubtedly was) and his lack of character, it would have
been to Skilling’s advantage to allow Fastow to operate as a
free agent, while Skilling created plausible deniability through
the creation of a structural hole—severing the link between
COO (later CEO) and CFO.120
The financial fraud of MCI/Worldcom presents another
possibility: senior managers colluding with the CEO. This case
also presents a nice example of board ignorance as a result of
managerial manipulation of information. Worldcom (as it is
118

Id. at 169-72.
Of course this is not in itself necessarily probative of their lack of
knowledge; only that the government has yet to make a case.
120
This is where Burt’s description of structural holes both as chasms and as
interlocks creates possibilities for expanding the utility of the theory. The use of
structural holes in the context described in the text envisions the creation of a chasm
which remains unfilled despite the fact that presumably both Skilling and Fastow
perceived the opportunity to fill it. This defensive use of structural holes is not part of
Burt’s explanation of the theory. It is consistent with the theory I develop here based
upon Burt’s work.
I also do not mean to suggest that as a moral or ethical matter we ought to
accept Skilling’s denial of knowledge as a legal defense if indeed this is what happened.
If I am right about the structure, however, it could make it difficult for prosecutors to
establish a strong case against him.
119
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now known), through chief financial officer Scott Sullivan and
several of his subordinates, simply made up numbers that
showed higher profits and revenues and lower costs than were
actually the case. CEO Bernie Ebbers was convicted in 2005 for
his role in the fraud. Yet it remains unclear how much he
knew. A jury found that, despite Ebbers’ denial of knowledge,
he in fact was aware of the fraud and may have participated in
it.121 As in the case of Enron, the clear purpose of the financial
fraud was to support and increase the company’s stock price
despite underlying business conditions that would have in fact
damaged the company (or at least its stock price) had they been
properly disclosed.
To the extent that Ebbers was involved, Worldcom
presents a paradigmatic example of collusion among the CEO
and senior managers to take advantage of a structural hole. In
contrast to the Enron case in which, on my reading, Skilling
intentionally broke the network tie between himself and
Fastow, in this case Ebbers and the senior managers involved
themselves formed a network. This network stopped at the
CEO and allowed the board to remain in the dark.
VI.

EXTENDING THE THEORY—THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
BOARD STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL CORPORATE
STRUCTURE

Thus far my analysis has proceeded as if there were no
significant differences among managerial systems. In fact there
are two basic paradigms of internal corporate structure. The
first is the traditional, hierarchical corporate bureaucracy, the
development of which is described thoroughly and compellingly
by Alfred Chandler.122 By this account, American big business
grew through the first half of the twentieth century as multiunit enterprises that, of necessity, employed legions of
corporate managers at various levels in huge bureaucracies.
Such bureaucracies persisted well into the end of the century.123
The second kind of corporate structure is more
condensed. Less hierarchical corporations rose in prominence
121

Robert Frank et. al., Executives On Trial: Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 3, 2003, at B1, B4.
122
See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
123
See DAVID M. GORDON, FAT AND MEAN: THE CORPORATE SQUEEZE OF
WORKING AMERICANS AND THE MYTH OF MANAGERIAL “DOWNSIZING” (1996).
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as the large bureaucracies began to come apart.124 These
“flatter” corporations are organizations in which layer upon
layer of middle management has been stripped out, leaving in
its place a CEO, a number of high level executives on a
relatively equal level, and several middle level managers above
the worker. Raghuram Rajan and Julie Wulf, after surveying
relevant information with respect to more than 300 large
American corporations over fourteen years, concluded that the
number of managers reporting directly to the CEO has
increased, and the levels of managers between the CEO and
the lowest manager with profit responsibility has decreased.
The number of managers reporting directly to the CEO
increased by 61% between 1986 and 1999, while the number of
positions between the CEO and the lowest manager with profit
responsibility decreased by 25%. This is clear evidence that
American corporate hierarchies are flattening.125
Each organizational type is designed to facilitate the
flow of information.126 Organizational theorists argue that the
particular internal structures, or information paths, vary with
the circumstances of the corporation. Bureaucratic structure
tends to be found in stable industries where such factors as
technology, supply, demand, and production are relatively
predictable and unvarying. In this situation, the bureaucracy
works precisely because it is designed for control, and control is
possible and likely efficient because of the predictability of the
business environment. Control is ensured by the creation of
rigid hierarchies and separated divisions in which information
flows up the pyramid to the responsible senior executive. By
contrast, horizontal structures work best in industrial
environments, where information and technology are rapidly
changing, and the need for control is supplanted by the need
124

This is not to say that there are not a significant number of American
corporations that still operate as hierarchical bureaucracies—only that they have
become less dominant in the corporate population and tend to be concentrated in
certain industries
125
Raghuram Rajan & Julie Wulf, The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel
Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., Apr.
2003, available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9633.pdf. Rajan and Wulf are
interested primarily in the effects this trend has had on managerial pay as well as the
causes of the flattening (which they conclude is due to exogenous pressure in the form
of technological and environmental changes.) These insights, while obviously
important, are not especially relevant to the central argument of this paper.
126
Nohria & Berkley, supra note 20, at 118 (“Organizations control on the
basis of knowledge: They are information-processors, or what could be seen in a
metaphorical sense as a kind of human-based computer.”)
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for flexibility. Such flexibility is best obtained by loosening the
bureaucratic hierarchy and allowing information to flow freely
through the various intracorporate networks. Building upon
structural hole theory as applied to CEO-board relationships,
these observations regarding internal corporate structure lead
me to formulate two additional, although tentative, hypotheses:
1. Corporations that are structured hierarchically and
have independent boards will have a moderately weak CEO;
and
2. Corporations that are structured horizontally and
have inside boards will have a moderately strong CEO.
Before examining the two hypotheses individually, I
propose four expanded hypotheses that result from the
conflation of the two theories:
1. Corporations that are structured hierarchically and
have inside boards will have a weak CEO;
2. Corporations that are structured hierarchically and
have independent boards will have a moderately weak CEO;
3. Corporations that are structured horizontally and
have inside boards will have a moderately strong CEO; and
4. Corporations that are structured horizontally and
have independent boards will have a strong CEO.
The hypotheses in this broader iteration can also be
presented in the form of a matrix:

Inside

Hierarchical

Horizontal

Weak

Moderately strong

Independent

Moderately weak

Strong
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I previously explained the two principal hypotheses
without reference to bureaucratic structure. Let me now
elaborate the more complex hypothesis. The information flows
to independent directors from inside directors are likely to be
substantially richer in bureaucratically-structured corporations
than in horizontal corporations. In a bureaucratic corporation,
almost by definition the CEO will have relatively few contacts
in the corporate hierarchy. That is, he will have relatively few
subordinates and bridge relatively few structural holes (as
many structural holes as he has immediate subordinates with
different responsibilities and therefore different networks).
Recall that the ideal situation for an actor to exploit his
information and control opportunities is to maximize the
number of structural holes he bridges, or to maximize the
number of his nonredundant network contacts. Bureaucratic
efficiency implies a chain of command, narrowing to only a few
immediate subordinates below the CEO. Thus the bureaucratic
structure provides, at least in an ideal state, few structural
hole opportunities—few nonredundant contacts—for the CEO.
Rajan and Wulf’s study found that, indeed, the number
of subordinates reporting directly to the CEO was significantly
smaller in a more bureaucratic era. As recently as 1986, the
median CEO in their study group had 4.4 executives reporting
directly to him.127 A web of hierarchy extended below these
executives, networks upon networks. This web of networks goes
much deeper in a bureaucratic corporation than in a horizontal
corporation and it broadens considerably as one proceeds down
the hierarchy from the CEO and his handful of subordinates.
One implication is that there are a greater number of points
within the pyramidal hierarchy at which network
entrepreneurs can exploit structural holes that are likely
unavailable to the CEO. The opportunities for informational
and control advantage are pushed further down the chain of
command to lower level managers. These managers, if they are
good network entrepreneurs, can exploit these structural hole
opportunities with the possible result that they can manipulate
or stop information before it reaches the level of the CEO or his
immediate subordinates.
While this argument suggests that top level executives
who would serve as inside directors also have a limited number
of direct reporting contacts in the bureaucratic corporation, the
127

Rajan & Wulf, supra note 125, at 1.
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issue is more complex. The theory does not necessarily imply
that the executives’ only contacts in the hierarchy are those
reporting directly to them (in a way that is probably more
characteristic of the CEO), and thus that they face
informational constraints similar to the CEO. On the contrary,
these mangers are likely to have more subordinates (and thus
more network contacts) that reach deeper into the hierarchy
than the CEO. Glenn Carroll and Albert Teo found that higher
level managers tend on average to have wider social networks
than do lower level managers, both within and independent of
the corporation.128 These social networks include other high
level managers not directly involved in that particular
manager’s area of expertise, suggesting more horizontal
networks across the corporation that can serve as crucial
sources of information.129 Moreover, Burt’s work shows that not
only do managers’ network sizes increase with rank,130 but that
in establishing their networks, managers typically choose a
“strategic partner[],” and that the most effective strategic
partner tends to be one of their bosses’ boss.131 The implication
is that higher level managers also have networks that go deep
into the bureaucratic structure, as lower managers leapfrog the
middleman and align themselves with higher level managers.132
The higher the level of manager, therefore, the more likely they
are to have both broad and deep networks. This line of
reasoning may also suggest that some second-tier executives
128

Carroll & Teo, supra note 95.
The specific position of the CEO is not addressed. But it seems likely, given
the nature of bureaucratic corporations, that the CEO will be more isolated in the
executive suite and less likely to have network ties to lower level managers. Moreover,
given the presumed desire of CEO subordinates to succeed the CEO, one should expect
these executives to adopt the CEO as their strategic partner (which of course puts the
CEO in a position to manipulate them in the manner of the law firm associate I earlier
described).
130
BURT, supra note 27, at 125.
131
Id. at 146, 150. It is not at all clear, though, that Burt would agree with my
analysis. Although he doesn’t address the point directly, he does point out that a
manager with a disorganized work force (which may correlate with my description of
some horizontal corporations) may be more able to exploit his workers to his advantage
than the manager of a well-organized work force (which may correlate to my
description of some bureaucratic corporations). Id. at 189.
132
It is, of course, possible that the CEO serves as strategic partner to
executives below the level of his immediate subordinates and thus establishes network
contacts for him deeper in the corporate structure than I have suggested in the text.
But even if there is some depth to CEO contacts in hierarchies, the flattened
corporation provides more subordinates of the CEO’s subordinates with whom he can
make contact, thus suggesting that the bureaucratic or flattened structure of the
corporation should be expected to have an effect on the CEO’s power independent of
board composition.
129
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strategically partner with the CEO, but given the CEO’s
ultimate responsibility for the corporation and his relatively
limited time, it may well be more likely that the CEO remains
relatively isolated in the executive suite. If the CEO’s
subordinates maximize their nonredundant contacts, they can
take advantage of the structural hole opportunities to gain
greater information and control than is available to the CEO.
All of this suggests that the managers on a level directly
below the CEO (the managers reporting directly to the CEO)
are likely to have significant nonredundant network contacts
that provide them with important information flows. How and
what they choose to report to the CEO who, theoretically, is
more constrained, is within their control. The fewer the
number of executives reporting directly to the CEO, the more
limited the CEO’s sources of information, and the more control
maintained by the senior executives. Thus it would appear that
the CEO’s position in the bureaucratic corporation is highly
dependent upon the extent to which his immediate
subordinates refrain from opportunistic use of their
informational positions, gained through their multiple
networks which provide them with more structural hole
opportunities than the CEO. The CEO, in choosing his
subordinates, must choose effectively—subordinates who are
trustworthy and reliable—in order to maximize his power
within the bureaucratic structure and prevent his own
informational isolation.
The likely conclusion is that inside directors in a
bureaucratic corporation are structurally more wired than the
CEO, and have independent relationships (by virtue of their
board seats) with independent directors. The insiders’
nonredundant contacts—their structural hole opportunities—
are more numerous and likely deeper than those of the CEO.
Now, the opportunity for critical information to bypass the
CEO is structurally apparent. Thus, network theory suggests
that the bureaucratic corporation with insiders on the board is
likely to have a relatively weak CEO. Figure Nine illustrates
this hypothesis.
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Corporations that are structured hierarchically
and have inside boards will have weak CEOs

The second hypothesis logically follows from the first.
Bureaucratic corporations with an independent board are likely
to have moderately weak CEOs (CEOs that are stronger than
in the bureaucratic/inside board corporation and weaker than
CEOs in each configuration of the horizontal corporation). The
same structural conditions I discussed above with respect to
the hierarchy continue to exist. This time, however, the CEO’s
subordinates lack direct ties to the independent directors.
Information flows through the CEO. The CEO is not in as
strong a position of informational control as he is in a
horizontal configuration because his immediate subordinates
(and therefore network contacts) are still few in number and
sufficiently connected within the corporation to maintain their
ability to control and manipulate the flow of information to the
CEO. But unless they have relationships with at least one
independent director beyond the context of the particular
corporation (which is possible if, for example, a chief financial
officer sits on the board of a corporation on which one of the
independent directors also sits), they have no informational
bypass route around the CEO. Thus, whatever the quality and
completeness of the information the CEO receives, he fills the
single structural hole between the board and his subordinates
and is in a position to control and manipulate the information
received by the board. The structure of the corporation
suggests that the quality and quantity of information he
receives will vary with the integrity and loyalty of his
subordinates, but his position with respect to the board is
strong. Figure Ten illustrates the hypothesis.
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Figure 10:

Corporations that are structured hierarchically
and have independent boards will have
moderately weak CEOs

Some empirical evidence suggests that this indeed is the
case. Ranjay Gulati and James Westphal demonstrated
(through the empirical examination of joint venture formation)
that “[i]ndependent board control over management may
actually produce a negative relationship between the CEO and
the board characterized by a lack of mutual understanding and
distrust.”133 (This, of course, is consistent with Bhagat and
Black’s work and the studies cited earlier suggesting that
independent boards actually impede corporate performance.134)
Gulati and Westphal attribute this largely to the
dissatisfaction felt by a CEO who believes he is under
significant scrutiny by an independent monitoring board. While
their conclusion with regard to mistrust seems compelling,
their explanation relies upon psychological motivations that
are difficult to verify. While the two are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, I present a theory that does not rely on
speculation, self-reporting, or psychological analysis. The board
is right to distrust the CEO because the CEO is in a structural
position to block or manipulate the flow of information to the
board. This conclusion, as will be clear, has its strongest
implications for hypothesis four.
The third hypothesis introduces the horizontal
corporation, a structure that has continued to proliferate over
the last several decades. The bureaucratic corporation derives
133

Gulati & Westphal, supra note 21, at 477, 498.
See Bhagat & Black, supra note 15, and supra text accompanying notes 15,
17, 23, and 105.
134
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from the traditional, Taylorist-inspired,135 pyramidal structures,
consisting of line workers to legions of middle managers to
Janissary corps of junior executives to the chosen few in the
executive suite and, ultimately, the CEO. This structure has, in
many industries (and to some extent within industries)
significantly flattened. Instead of pyramidal hierarchies, we
are now more likely to see corporations that have stripped out
much of the middle managerial ranks and spread the executive
power over a larger horizontal range of senior managers, who
report not to the CEO’s subordinates, but to the CEO directly.
Rajan and Wulf found that the average number of senior
managers reporting directly to the CEO had increased by 61%,
from 4.4 to 7.2, between 1986 and 1999.136
In the horizontal corporation, the managerial levels
below the top executives are dramatically reduced and the
number of executives reporting directly to the CEO is
significantly increased. From the standpoint of structural
holes, the consequences are immediately apparent. While the
CEO’s subordinates may still retain some informational control
based upon their networks, two things change. First, those
networks are considerably reduced in size. The manager has
fewer subordinates, and the manager’s subordinates have
fewer subordinates. Even if, as a consequence, the manager’s
network becomes flatter (i.e. managers at the same level will
interact in networks),137 their ability to control information
flows to the CEO is considerably diminished. This is because
the number of contacts the CEO has into the various networks
within the corporation corresponds with the number of
executives reporting to him. In other words, he bridges more
structural holes than he does in the hierarchical corporation.
Unless one assumes that the executives will collude to restrict
the information flow to the CEO,138 the CEO will have
135

See generally FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT (1911); Nohria & Berkley, supra note 20, 108-26. The classic work on the
large, multi-divisional bureaucracy is of course ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE
HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
136
Rajan & Wulf, supra note 125, at 1. But see GORDON, supra note 123, for
an argument that bureaucracies which flatten as the result of significant layoffs in the
middle management ranks relatively quickly re-establish their hierarchies through
rehirings.
137
This situation, by the way, has been found by Burt to be most
advantageous to managers in their ability to take advantage of structural holes. Burt,
supra note 62.
138
This is possible, but unlikely, given the normal ambitions of second-level
executives eventually to ascend to a CEO position either in their own or another
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materially greater informational opportunities. Moreover,
when applying this theory to the ideal model of the horizontal
corporation, each of these senior executives performs different
functions, and has access to (and reports to the CEO) different
types of information. As the number of CEO subordinates
multiplies, the diffusion of job descriptions is likely to increase.
The result is that the CEO is increasingly able to receive,
convey, and control information—not to mention manipulate
his subordinates against one another.139 Thus we should expect
that the CEO in the horizontal structure is, counterintuitively,
more powerful than the CEO in a bureaucratic organization
with either an inside or an independent board. Hypothesis
three is illustrated in Figure Eleven.

corporation which makes them in large part dependent upon the good will of their own
CEO. Raymond T. Sparrowe and Robert C. Liden, combining sociological exchange
theory which looks at the quality of relationships, and network theory, which looks at
the structure of relationships, suggest that “where the timing and equivalence of
returns is indefinite and the interest of the exchange partners is cooperative,” the
exchange relationship (as between CEO and immediate subordinate) is likely to be
cooperative and competition (of the manipulative sort described in the text) is likely to
be contrary to group norms. In contrast, structural holes are “characterized by
immediacy and equivalence of returns and mutual self-interest”—in other words,
competition, which (in my view) is only to be expected given the fact that structural
holes are definitionally competitive. Raymond T. Sparrowe & Robert C. Liden, Process
and Structure in Leader-Member Exchange, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 522, 532 (1997). If
this is true, one might reasonably ask whether the CEO-subordinate relationship
which, after all, is characterized by structural holes, is just as likely to be competitive
and manipulative as the CEO-board relationship, which is also characterized by
structural holes. I suspect that the answer is not, because the CEO-subordinate
relationship is not itself competitive. That is to say, there is only one CEO, and while
subordinates might fight to succeed him (establishing competitive relationships at the
subordinate level which further destroys the incentives for them to collude in
withholding information from the CEO), they are reliant upon his good will and high
opinion (at least as long as the CEO is successful) for their chances to be named
successor.
139
Burt also notes that this kind of structure, in which managers have few or
no peers, increases the value of social capital to them in terms of their chances of
promotion. This is true for bureaucratic organizations, but in network organizations (or
horizontal corporations) it is also valuable to managers with multiple peers. Burt,
supra note 62. This observation is not especially significant for my argument because
in the stylized firm I’ve created each CEO subordinate can only rise within the firm by
becoming CEO. But there is a highly important implication of this analysis which is
most relevant to hypothesis four. The structure puts them in the position of monopolist
over the kinds of work they do. The CEO is, in this analysis, the ultimate monopolist,
since nobody in the corporation does the work of the CEO, and it is the ability to use
this monopoly position (which would be constrained by inside directors) that gives him
the greatest power.
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Corporations that are structured horizontally
and have inside boards will have moderately
strong CEOs

A qualification is in order. If bureaucratic organizations
are built for control, horizontal organizations are built for
freedom. Information flows are significantly less constrained in
a horizontal organization, as are relationships defined by
position. Freedom is the opportunity provided by structural
holes. The implication is that in the horizontal organization,
managers are freer to establish their own networks across the
corporation, and thus skillful network entrepreneurs can
achieve a level of informational control that is more widespread
than is likely in the more constrained bureaucracy. In such a
case, the network entrepreneur could be in a better position to
control broader information flows to the CEO and his
immediate subordinates, and thus the CEO would be
weakened. While I believe that the CEO’s greater access into
the network structures of the horizontal corporation is likely to
give him greater power, this is not certain, and the hypothesis
remains tentative.
The key variable now becomes the board. If the board
has insiders as well as independent directors, the CEO’s
position is likely to be weakened because, as in hypothesis one,
the presence of insiders on the board gives network contacts to
the independents into the corporate networks by virtue of their
contacts with the insiders. In light of the CEO’s strong
structural position in the horizontal corporation (with his own
multiple nonredundant contacts into the corporation’s
networks), the independent directors’ ability to circumvent the
CEO will be reduced. It will not be entirely eliminated, because
opportunistic senior managers hypothetically working in
different aspects of the business might take advantage of their
board positions to manipulate the independents. The risk of
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detection by the CEO, however, is increased: the senior
managers’ corporate responsibilities are more distinct,
therefore the CEO’s ability to discern the source of information
that bypasses him will be improved. Thus, in hypothesis three,
we can expect the CEO in the horizontal corporation with an
inside board to be stronger than the CEO in a bureaucratic
corporation, but not as strong as he might be were the board
composed solely of independent directors as in hypothesis four.
My conclusions are tentative with respect to the four
restated hypotheses that address both board structure and
bureaucratic structure, and require further study. As I noted
earlier, corporations are highly varied in their internal
organizations despite the existence of distinct and identifiable
patterns. It may be that in a particular bureaucracy, CEO
control is so tight that defection in the form of information
blockage or distortion at lower levels is unlikely. But if true, it
is most likely to be true in a corporation that does business in a
single location. Burt found that in a corporation with multiple
and geographically dispersed business operations, managers
whose jobs put them at the “frontiers,” i.e., required them to be
in contact with managers in other locations, had greater
structural hole opportunities than managers whose
responsibilities were confined to a single location. Thus the
tightly controlled bureaucracy of the Taylorist model may be
increasingly rare.
At the same time, as I noted earlier, horizontal
corporations are designed to permit freer and less structured
information flows. In terms of network theory, the networks
are not as constrained by bureaucratic structure. As a result, it
may well be that greater structural hole opportunities exist in
these corporations because the diffusion of job responsibility
implied by the horizontal structure creates internal frontiers
which enable even managers working in the same location to
identify more numerous structural holes. Since structural holes
are opportunities to receive, control, and manipulate
information, it may be the case that in the horizontal
corporation the CEO will be less well informed than in the
bureaucratic corporation. On the other hand, the broader and
shallower management structure of the horizontal corporation
suggests that the likelihood of detecting informational blockage
and manipulation is greater than in the hierarchical structure,
with potentially dire consequences for those acting
opportunistically to the disadvantage of the corporation or the
CEO.
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Because of the uncertain affect of the internal corporate
structure on information flows, these hypotheses are tentative.
For the time being, I suggest that bureaucratic structure be
seen as an independent variable that magnifies the effects of
the presence of an inside or independent board. While this
variable is not likely to have as substantial an explanatory
impact as do the simpler hypotheses stated at the outset, it
merits additional consideration and empirical research.
VII.

MOVING BEYOND THE BOARD IN CORPORATE LAW
REFORM

Almost since the advent of the modern corporation,
corporate scholars have focused on the board of directors as the
body most capable of protecting the corporation and its
stockholders from managerial depredation. Beginning in the
1980s, the reform effort increasingly focused on the importance
of independent directors as the solution to this monitoring
problem. Recent evidence, however, suggests that the resulting
changes in corporate boards have not been entirely beneficial.
For example, the CEO of a corporation with an independent
board has the ability to distort his compensation and the
corporation’s broader compensation structure in ways that are
disadvantageous to the corporation. Structural hole theory
provides an explanation for these phenomena, as well as for the
recent corporate scandals that occurred beneath the boards’
radar screens. Independent boards magnify CEO power. Since
independent boards have been the consensus solution after
almost a century of attempts at board reform, this traditional
focus on the board of directors is misplaced. Instead,
governance scholars must begin to study the internal workings
of the corporation, and how these networks link to the CEO,
senior executives, and the board, if they are to devise effective
solutions to problems of corporate governance.
One specific application relates directly to the current
state of the law on board monitoring. In the widely discussed
opinion in In re Caremark International,140 the Chancellor
represents the boards’ obligation as the duty to create
information flows in both directions (from the board as to
corporate policy and from the bureaucracy as to compliance

140

698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).

4/11/2005 2:37:27 PM

2005]

STRUCTURAL HOLES, CEOS, AND INFORMATIONAL MONOPOLIES 1367

information).141 My argument suggests that in order to fulfill
this duty, it cannot be enough for the board simply to establish
lines of reporting. Structural holes, which provide
opportunities to block or distort information throughout the
hierarchy up to and including the CEO, must be identified in
order for the board effectively to monitor the flow and accuracy
of corporate information. Monitoring information flows is only
effective when one accurately identifies the network nodes that
are the corporate actors who bridge structural holes and thus
control the flow of information. In the absence of attention to
internal structure, monitoring will have limited utility: the
more limited the more independent the board.
The point of this paper is not, at this early stage, to
prescribe specific corporate reforms. While the theory is
powerful, reform must rest upon empirical evidence. Instead, I
suggest that certain paths of research must be investigated in
order to achieve effective corporate reform. The debate over
board function has been one of manager versus monitor, with
the latter clearly victorious. Although I do not suggest that the
board as an institution is irrelevant, my argument raises the
question, starkly, of the board’s utility. While others have
proposed alternative conceptions of the board,142 my theory
indicates the difficulty in evaluating, much less prescribing,
the board’s function and composition without an inquiry into
the relationship between the board and the internal structure
of the corporation. I have presented the theory as a general
one, as it would be useful first to study it that way, although
individual corporate evaluation may ultimately be necessary. It
will likely be found that one size doesn’t fit all.
At least as important, my hypotheses suggest that we
take a hard look at the role of the CEO and senior managers.
In recent years in particular, CEOs of major corporations have
developed something of a “rock star” quality, followed by the
popular press, lionized in success while derided in defeat. No
doubt this has contributed to CEO self-image, if not actual
power. But board reform without attention to the role and
power of the CEO and the corporation’s internal managerial

141

I have elsewhere argued that the opinion is disingenuous, see Mitchell,
supra note 38, but it is the articulated state of the law.
142
See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 14 (suggesting a dual board); Fisch, supra note
14 (suggesting individually tailored boards).
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structure is a fruitless endeavor. Corporate law scholars have,
with rare exceptions, ignored this critical aspect of corporate
governance. Attention should turn to this subject.

